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1 
ARTICLES 
THE ILLUSION OF FISCAL ILLUSION         
IN REGULATORY TAKINGS 
 
BETHANY R. BERGER* 
The main economic justification for compensating owners for losses from 
land use restrictions is based on a surprising mistake.  Compensation is said 
to make governments internalize the costs of their actions and therefore enact 
more efficient regulations.  Without compensation, the argument goes, 
governments operate under a fiscal illusion because, from their perspective, 
their actions are costless.  The problem is that this argument makes no sense as 
a description of the actual costs to governments. 
Taxation is the main way governments get revenue, and most taxes depend 
on the value of property and its permissible uses.  If a government restricts 
land use so as to reduce the value of a parcel or the income produced by it, its 
residents, or its patrons, tax revenues should go down.  If, however, the 
restriction creates benefits, tax revenues should go up.  While there are 
limitations to the accuracy and efficacy of the tax revenue signal, efficient 
regulations should have a net positive effect on governmental revenues, while 
inefficient ones should have a net negative effect.  Fully compensating owners, 
in contrast, does not lead the government to accurately internalize societal 
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costs—it rather adds a new and much larger cost.  Because this cost usually 
far exceeds revenue gains, governments may rationally forgo even efficient 
regulations.  Owner compensation, in other words, does not correct fiscal 
illusion, it creates it. 
Revealing the illusion of fiscal illusion leaves standing much older 
arguments that compensation is required as a matter of fairness.  But clearing 
away the main efficiency justification for one-to-one compensation permits 
clearer-eyed assessment of whether and to what extent fairness may require 
compensation and reveals that compensation measures in the name of 
efficiency may, in fact, undermine it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time in decades, the constitutional standard for 
requiring compensation for land use restrictions that leave title in the 
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original owner may be facing revision.  In the last half century, the 
United States Supreme Court has affirmed a regulatory takings claim 
only once, in a 1992 case where the courts below found the restriction 
rendered the property at issue “valueless.”1  In January 2016, however, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Murr v. Wisconsin,2 the first 
regulatory takings case to be decided by the Roberts Court.3 
Because regulatory takings doctrine has little direct support in 
constitutional text or history, and earlier cases mostly rule against 
regulatory takings, the push to expand regulatory takings often rests 
on policy arguments.4  This Article argues that the central efficiency 
                                                          
 1. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).  The regulation 
there prohibited any building at all on the owner’s two beachfront lots for erosion 
control purposes, although all the neighboring lots already had homes on them.  Id. at 
1007–08.  Even there the Court remanded to determine whether the economic wipe-
out was permitted under “background principles of nuisance and property law.”  Id. at 
1031–32.  Although the South Carolina Supreme Court found no such background 
principle on remand in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 
1992), other state courts have exploited the loophole.  See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus 
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy:  The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings 
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 321, 323 (2005) (examining the use of 
background principles as categorical defenses to takings claims). 
 2. 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016), granting cert. in Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 
WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per curiam).  In the case below, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that a restriction on building on one of two 
neighboring lots owned by the same owners was not a per se taking of the owner’s 
property).  Murr, 2014 WL 7271581, at *8. 
 3. Several Roberts Court decisions have expanded the potential for takings 
claims when governments acquire or claim ownership of property.  See Horne v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (finding a taking in federal demand for 
personal property); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2599, 2603 (2013) (holding that demands for money in exchange for a permit must 
be considered under the exactions analysis); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (plurality opinion) (2010) (opining that 
a legislative or judicial disposition transferring land ownership could be considered a 
taking).  These decisions might be applied to future regulatory takings cases.  The 
last case to directly consider a regulatory takings claim, however, was Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., decided on the eve of Roberts’ ascension to the Court.  544 U.S. 528 
(2005), abrogating Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).  The Court in Lingle 
unanimously narrowed the grounds for finding a regulatory taking, overruling a 
previous suggestion that regulatory restrictions must “substantially advance” their 
stated purpose.  Id. at 531, 548. 
 4. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) (arguing that the original 
understanding of just compensation did not include regulatory takings). 
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argument for expansion—often dubbed “fiscal illusion”5—is without 
foundation.  Understanding the illusion at the heart of fiscal illusion 
arguments for compensation places a sharper focus on the other 
arguments for and against broader compensation requirements. 
The efficiency argument goes like this.  If governments need not 
compensate owners for the loss in value caused by restricting land 
use, they need not internalize the costs of their actions.6  As a result, 
governments will enact inefficient restrictions because they 
experience only the benefits of the land use restrictions.7  
Governments operate under a fiscal illusion, in other words, 
because—from their perspective—their actions are costless. 
The argument seems at first glance a common-sense extension of 
the cost-internalization argument often applied in analyses of private 
uses of land.8  But it ignores fundamental differences with respect to 
governmental income streams that make the cost-internalization 
argument inapplicable.  In fact, the assertion of fiscal illusion in 
regulatory restrictions is itself based on the illusion that governments 
do not already experience the costs of reductions in property value. 
Governmental revenue is intimately tied to property value—quite 
directly for property taxes, and indirectly for most sales and income 
taxes.9  Governments thus already feel the costs of actions that reduce 
the value or productivity of property but leave title in the hands of 
the owner.  These costs will be balanced against any economic 
benefits the action creates in the jurisdiction, whether by increasing 
tax revenue or decreasing the costs of taxpayer-funded services 
associated with the property.  Directly compensating owners for losses 
due to use restrictions, in contrast, will not lead the government to 
accurately internalize this loss.  Rather, it will add a new and much 
larger cost to the action.  If this additional cost is greater than the 
expected benefits of the land use measure, the government will 
                                                          
 5. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:  An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 572–73, 621 (1984) (discussing “fiscal 
illusion” in takings). 
 6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 186–87 (5th ed. 2009). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Nuisance laws, for example, are justified in part by the need to ensure that 
parties whose land uses impinge on each other’s take into account the social costs 
they create, so that the resulting combination of land uses maximizes the overall 
benefits from the use.  See id. at 180–81; see also Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 
N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (reasoning that the risk of permanent damages would 
“be a reasonable[,] effective spur to research for improved techniques to minimize 
nuisance”). 
 9. See discussion infra Part II. 
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rationally decide to forgo the measure, even though the sum of the 
costs and benefits to the community would be positive.  Requiring 
owner compensation does not correct the assumed fiscal illusion.  It 
simply creates a new one. 
The surprising mistake at the heart of many arguments about 
takings is the result of a broader phenomenon.  As others have noted, 
law and economics scholarship too often analyzes problems as 
isolated transactions between parties, overlooking both the 
interdependence of multiple actors and the importance of their 
social and legal context.10  In this case, by treating land use 
restrictions as bilateral transactions in which some property owners 
lose and others (or perhaps governments themselves) win, scholars 
have ignored the tax structure that results in governments 
experiencing these losses as well. 
There are, of course, limitations to the accuracy and impact of the 
tax cost signal.11  The myriad qualifications, exceptions, and 
deductions in the tax system mean that there will almost never be a 
one-to-one correspondence between the tax received and the 
underlying value taxed.  Nevertheless, the goal of the system is to 
achieve this correspondence, regardless of the extent to which the 
system actually realizes this goal.  Practically, moreover, there is a 
rough relationship between tax returns and fluctuations in 
underlying value taxed, something lacking with respect to direct 
compensation to owners for claimed losses. 
In addition, different levels of government will feel the impact of 
loss in property value more or less keenly.12  Local governments, 
which rely heavily on property taxes, will be most sensitive to land use 
restrictions that reduce the assessed value of the property; state 
governments will be less sensitive; and federal governments, even less.  
While state and federal governments will be more sensitive to effects 
on sales and income taxes, the relationship between land use 
regulation and such taxes is less readily calculated.  Similarly, 
expenses associated with property use—such as funding costs of 
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:  
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77–78 (2004) 
(“[L]aw and economics scholars see victims in pollution disputes as acting 
independently of each other, with no interdependencies and no sense of social 
embeddedness. . . .  [This] is a highly incomplete description of human behavior, 
one that can be misleading in some important settings.”). 
 11. See discussion infra Part II. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II. 
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policing, providing public education, or remediating environmental 
degradation—are borne by different levels of government.13 
There is also a robust debate on whether and to what extent 
governments change their behavior in response to financial losses.14  
Some argue that revenue generation does not motivate political 
actors in the same way that it motivates private individuals or firms.15  
The central currency for politicians is votes, not dollars; while 
revenue losses—with resulting tax increases or service reductions—
may affect political goals, they do not necessarily do so.  In addition, 
the structure of government decision making often means that while 
one entity may be responsible for making land use decisions, another 
entity will be responsible for paying for them.  But the premise of the 
fiscal illusion argument is that governments and their constituents 
need to feel both the costs and the benefits of governmental action in 
order to make efficient decisions.  The point of this Article is that 
through the tax system, they already do.16 
Establishing that governments already feel the costs of land use 
restrictions does not mean that compensation is never necessary.  
Owners may still be entitled to compensation for their losses as a 
matter of fairness.17  But revealing the mistake on which many 
efficiency arguments for compensation are based facilitates clear-eyed 
assessments of fairness arguments for and against compensation.  
Mirroring the way that, on a societal level, tax revenues may both rise 
and fall as a result of land use restrictions, values of individual parcels 
may be both enhanced and depressed by land use laws.  Demanding 
compensation when the same infrastructure restricts realization of 
                                                          
 13. See DAVID BRUNORI, LOCAL TAX POLICY:  A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE 46–47 (2d ed. 
2007) (chronicling the stability of property tax and its use in financing public services). 
 14. See discussion infra Part III.  Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government 
Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 
345 (2000) (arguing that governments do not respond to compensation 
requirements), with WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS:  HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES 39–40 (2001) (arguing that municipal governments are sensitive to 
compensation requirements). 
 15. Levinson, supra note 14, at 347. 
 16. Indeed, while some scholars challenge direct compensation as an effective 
prod for inefficient regulation, there is overwhelming evidence that zoning, the 
primary form of land use restriction, seeks to maximize tax revenue and limit 
demands on that revenue.  See, e.g., ANN O’M. BOWMAN & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, TERRA 
INCOGNITA:  VACANT LAND AND URBAN STRATEGIES 55–59 (2004) (describing ways 
municipalities shift land use strategies to maximize different forms of tax revenue). 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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those opportunities is sometimes, to borrow a phrase, a demand to 
socialize costs but privatize benefits. 
Part I of this Article outlines the takings debate, how the concept of 
fiscal illusion has been employed in that debate, and how the link 
between tax revenues and land value undermines the concept.  Part 
II provides more detail on the taxes impacted by land use regulation 
and discusses limitations to the link between taxation and land value.  
Part III discusses whether, and to what extent, political decision 
making is actually sensitive to these revenue impacts.  Part IV suggests 
ways that exposing the illusion of fiscal illusion adjusts the focus on 
arguments for and against compensation as a matter of fairness and 
briefly shows how this analysis applies to Murr v. Wisconsin. 
I.  FISCAL ILLUSION ARGUMENTS AND THEIR FLAWS 
Increasing efficiency is one of the core arguments for expanding 
the category of “takings,” governmental impacts on property for 
which compensation is required.18  The central economic justification 
for compensation is that it will ensure that governments take into 
account the societal costs of their actions, a phenomenon often 
described as counteracting fiscal illusion.  This justification is based 
on the premise that governments do not already experience the 
losses caused by actions that reduce property value.  Because 
governments already lose revenue whenever their actions reduce the 
value of property or the activities associated with it, requiring direct 
compensation to the owner does not mitigate fiscal illusion.  Rather, 
it creates new distortions that may deter efficient decision making.  
This Section briefly outlines the takings debate, the role of fiscal 
illusion arguments in this debate, and the fallacy of those arguments. 
A. Fiscal Illusion in Takings Scholarship 
Whether property has been “taken,” so as to demand 
compensation, is the most palpable site of interaction between public 
and private definitions of property and is a fertile battleground for 
debates over the role of each.  Since at least 1967, when Frank 
Michelman wrote his masterful exploration of the reasons for the 
compensation requirement, debates about takings have revolved 
around two policy goals:  fairness, or respect for the rights of those 
affected by governmental action, and utility or efficiency, or 
                                                          
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
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incentives for uses of property that will maximize public welfare.19  
The sweeping nature of these goals, perhaps, explains why takings 
jurisprudence offers as many questions as answers.  When and why 
the government must pay compensation for actions that affect 
property has been described as a “muddle,”20 “a secret code that only 
a momentary majority of the Court is able to understand,”21 a 
candidate for the “doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle 
prize,”22 and “like finding shapes in the clouds,” a process that says 
“more about the observer than the clouds themselves.”23 
Despite this muddle, the broad contours of takings doctrine are 
easy to outline.  When the government takes title to property or 
orders its permanent occupation by a stranger, there is almost always 
a taking, and the government must pay the owner the fair market 
value of the property acquired.24  Similarly, when the government 
renders real property valueless, there will generally be a taking.25  But 
where the government simply restricts the uses of property, even if 
the restriction significantly reduces the property’s value, 
compensation will very rarely be required.26 
                                                          
 19. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214, 1219 (1967). 
 20. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:  Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984). 
 21. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Commentary, Deterrence and Distribution in 
the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999). 
 22. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993). 
 23. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value:  Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 741 (2005). 
 24. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) 
(holding that permanent physical occupations, no matter how small, require 
compensation).  The Supreme Court has recently held that this principle usually 
applies to personal as well as real property.  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 
2426 (2015). 
 25. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992) (holding 
that economic wipe-outs are per se compensable unless the regulations merely 
implemented “background principles of nuisance and property law”). 
 26. William A. Fischel, Why Are Judges So Wary of Regulatory Takings?, in PRIVATE 
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  THE FUTURE OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 50, 55 (Harvey M. 
Jacobs ed., 2004) (stating that under the Penn Central test, the “bottom line is that 
the complaining property owner almost always loses”); see, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 319–20 (2002) 
(finding no taking when temporary moratoria prevented any development of 
property for more than two years); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 116–17, 138 (1978) (finding no taking in the implementation of a 
landmark protection law preventing Grand Central Station from selling its air rights 
for millions of dollars). 
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It is this last thread of the doctrine that has come under attack as 
furthering fiscal illusion.  The argument goes like this:  if governments 
do not have to pay owners for the costs of actions that reduce the value 
of property, they will act as though those actions are costless.  The 
result will be overregulation or restrictions on uses of property whose 
net effect is to detract from public welfare.  If, however, governments 
compensate owners for their losses, they will internalize the costs of 
their actions and make more efficient decisions.27 
Although scholars made this argument in earlier articles,28 
Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld dubbed it “fiscal illusion” in 
1984, and the title has stuck.29  This use of the phrase is somewhat 
different from its use in the public choice literature that coined it, 
where fiscal illusion primarily describes the failure of voters to 
understand the cost of government services that they are already in 
fact paying for through taxes or other means.30  In takings literature, 
in contrast, “fiscal illusion” seems instead to mean that the 
government does not take into account the societal costs of 
governmental actions unless the government itself pays for them: 
[A] governmental regulatory body will over- or under-regulate if it 
does not consider all budgetary and social costs.  The actual result 
depends upon the distribution of individual tastes and political 
influence within the community.  As applied to the land market, if 
the governmental body responsible for zoning decisions does not 
pay compensation, it cannot make socially beneficial decisions.  In 
other words, the governmental body is subject to “fiscal 
                                                          
 27. Throughout the literature, and in this Article as well, “efficiency” generally 
refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, meaning that the regulation generates benefits to 
society as a whole that outweigh its costs, not that the action makes all those affected 
by it better off.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 43–44; Jules Coleman, The 
Normative Basis of Economic Analysis:  A Critical Review of Richard Posner’s The 
Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1982) (book review) 
(discussing Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto superiority definitions of efficiency); Thomas S. 
Ulen, Commentary, Professor Crespi on Chicago, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 193 (1997) 
(noting that law and economics scholars have made Kaldor-Hicks the “default” 
criterion for efficiency). 
 28. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls:  An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1977) (arguing that compensation will lead municipal 
officials to conduct more thorough cost-benefit analyses of alternate measures); 
Michelman, supra note 19, at 1218 (arguing that compensation may provide 
assurance that “society deems the measure . . . efficient”). 
 29. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 621. 
 30. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT:  THE 
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 128–30 (1977) (arguing that voters make fiscal choices 
in response to the perceived cost of public services rather than their actual costs). 
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illusion.”  Fiscal illusion arises because the costs of governmental 
actions are generally discounted by the decisionmaking body unless 
they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense.31 
Whether called fiscal illusion or cost internalization, the concept is 
a polestar of economic analysis of takings.  The leading law and 
economics textbook, for example, summarizes it as follows: 
Obviously, the noncompensability of regulations gives government 
officials an incentive to overregulate, whereas the compensability of 
takings makes governmental officials internalize the full cost of 
expropriating private property.  If the state need not compensate 
for restrictions, then it will impose too many of them.  If there are 
too many restrictions, then resources will not be put to their 
highest-valued use.  Thus, uncompensated restrictions result in 
inefficient uses.32 
Compensation, in contrast, provides a check to ensure that 
governments will enact only efficient actions.  Richard Epstein puts it 
bluntly:  “If by chance, the diffuse social gains do outweigh the 
localized costs, then the ‘winners’ should be able to push the 
condemnation measure through, with compensation.”33  Richard 
Posner, one of the founding figures in law and economics, 
summarizes the argument as follows:  “The simplest economic 
                                                          
 31. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 621 (footnotes omitted).  Although 
those who argue that compensation will lead to more efficient results do sometimes 
argue that the efficiency-generating impact of the results stems from voter pressure, 
they generally do not incorporate the public choice insight that the form—rather 
than amount—of public expenditures is crucial.  See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 
U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that uncompensated regulation 
permits wealth transfer “to be achieved ‘off budget,’ with relative invisibility and thus 
relative immunity from normal democratic processes”).  In public choice literature, 
however, full compensation may be consistent with fiscal illusion depending on 
whether the connection between compensation and voter tax bills is sufficiently 
salient.  See Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion:  A Survey, 
in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RUSSELL MATHEWS 65, 65–
67 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (summarizing the fiscal illusion thesis). 
 32. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 186–88.  Cooter and Ulen then go on to 
state moral hazard problems with across-the-board compensation.  See DAVID A. DANA 
& THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:  TAKINGS 41–46 (2002) (calling “fiscal illusion,” 
along with fairness and process concerns, one of three central arguments for 
compensation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!  THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE 
REGULATION 105 (2015) (“[T]he appeal of regulatory takings to economists is that it 
makes regulators pay close attention to the economic consequences of their 
actions”); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127–29 
(2004) (summarizing and critiquing the cost internalization argument). 
 33. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT:  HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (2008). 
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explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it 
prevents the government from overusing the taking power.”34 
Scholars have raised important qualifications of the efficiency-
generating results of compensation standing alone.  In some cases, 
high transaction costs undermine the efficiency benefits of 
compensation.35  Compensation may also create a moral hazard by 
effectively insuring those engaging in potentially harmful behavior, 
leading them to invest without regard to the risk of government 
prohibition.36  Further, cost internalization does not require—and is 
sometimes undermined by requiring—governments to pay owners, 
rather than putting the money into some other worthy fund.37 
Scholars have also raised more fundamental challenges to the 
efficiency argument for compensation.  One such challenge is that 
governmental actors are far more concerned with getting and 
maintaining political power—a goal that needs not have a direct 
connection with revenue going out and has an even more tenuous 
connection with revenue coming in.38  Another challenge is that 
measuring the impact of government actions by their monetary costs 
and benefits may miss less monetizable impacts, such as the harms of 
racism or pollution, the benefits of an old growth forest, or the 
importance of preserving existing communities.39 
                                                          
 34. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992). 
 35. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 1214–15 (discussing “settlement costs” for 
paying compensation). 
 36. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
537–40 (1986). 
 37. See Heller & Krier, supra note 21, at 1000 (arguing that at times efficiency 
would be better served if governments “pay deterrence damages into a special fund, 
or even into general revenues”). 
 38. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 
279, 280 (1992) (asserting that compensation may sometimes decrease public 
opposition, thereby reducing incentives for officials to enact only efficient 
measures); Levinson, supra note 14, at 345 (arguing that government actors are less 
responsive to financial factors than political ones); see also FISCHEL, HOMEOWNER 
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 39–40 (discussing the different political considerations 
of local versus larger governments).  For a recent empirical study showing that 
increasing compensation requirements did not deter eminent domain in Israel, see 
Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind?  An 
Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent Domain 
Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2621778. 
 39. See generally Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates:  Property Law in a Free 
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1035–38 (2009) (discussing 
limitations of the efficiency approach). 
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These arguments, however, have largely led economics-minded 
authors to develop proposals tinkering with when and how much 
compensation should be required rather than to discard reliance on 
the concept.40  Despite decades of critique, therefore, fiscal illusion 
remains “perhaps the most common economic explanation of the 
constitutional mandate of just compensation.”41 
B. The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Brief 
Missed in all the writing on fiscal illusion in regulatory takings is 
that the concept makes no sense as a description of the actual costs to 
governments.  Taxation is the main way governments get revenue, 
and most taxes depend on the value of property and its permissible 
uses.  If governments restrict property use so as to reduce the value of 
the property or the income produced by it, its residents, or its 
patrons, they already feel the loss in their budgets.  If the restriction 
enhances the value of property or limits the taxpayer-funded services 
associated with it, the government will experience those benefits as 
well.  Efficient regulations, therefore, should have a net positive effect 
on governmental revenues, while inefficient ones should have a net 
negative effect.  Compensation will only undermine accurate 
internalization of the societal cost of regulation. 
This argument has less force with regard to physical takings.  When 
the government physically acquires the property of another, it 
actually gets the property itself.  Therefore, the government has 
gained an asset with an easily identifiable market value and will 
roughly break even if it compensates the owner for the same 
amount.42  Conversely, if the government need not pay 
                                                          
 40. See Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of 
Compensation for Takings, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 188, 200 (2006) (arguing that 
whether compensation is paid should depend on the relative political power of 
beneficiaries and land owners); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory 
Takings:  When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 750–51 (1994) 
(proposing that compensation should be owed only if the land was used efficiently 
before regulation or if the government passed the regulation inefficiently); Paul 
Pecorino, Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 269, 271, 
274 (2011) (positing that compensation should depend in part on the distortionary 
impact of taxes and the level of governmental bias). 
 41. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings 
Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1682 (2010). 
 42. The government will only “roughly break even” because some additional 
costs are not included here, such as the cost of finding the owner and setting 
compensation, and the loss of tax revenue on the property.  But except for very 
miniscule governmental invasions—see, for example, Loretto v. Teleprompter 
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compensation, it collects a windfall and may have an economic incentive 
to overtake.43  Compensation thus makes more sense as a measure to 
discourage inefficiency in physical takings—but those are the actions for 
which compensation is already clearly required anyway. 
In contrast, where the owner retains title to the property, taxation 
means that the government already feels her pain.  This concept is 
clearest for property taxes, which are based on a property’s assessed 
value.  Because property is assessed at its highest and best legal use, if 
a regulation prohibits its most lucrative use, then its assessed value 
should decrease, which should reduce taxes from the property.44  But 
                                                          
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (property occupied had almost no 
value)—the value of the property itself should be so much larger that transaction 
costs and lost tax revenues are relatively insignificant in the overall transaction. 
 43. One could make a similar argument with respect to land use restrictions.  
Covenants are private agreements for land use restrictions and include some of the 
same things—commercial use restrictions, single family home requirements, etc.—
included in land use laws.  Why, when the government enacts such a restriction, 
aren’t they acquiring the value of the equivalent private covenant?  There are 
practical and theoretical objections to this argument.  The practical objection is that 
placing a dollar value on such restrictions is far more difficult than valuing physical 
property.  Covenants are usually created as part of an exchange of land or as a 
voluntary exchange for tax benefits, so there are few comparable market sales of such 
restrictions.  Indeed, recent investigations suggest donations of such restrictions are 
routinely overvalued.  See Josh Eagle, Notional Generosity:  Explaining Charitable Donors’ 
High Willingness to Part with Conservation Easements, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 70 & 
n.122 (2011) (arguing that tax deductions for conservation easements overvalue the 
easements); Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich:  The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA. 
TAX REV. 229, 229 (2014) (contending that the façade easement tax deduction 
overvalues the easements); see also JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX:  LEGAL AND POLICY 
ISSUES FOR THE PROPERTY TAX IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (2016) (discussing the 
difficulty of valuing conservation easements).  The theoretical objection is that 
physical property, once taken, belongs to the government in a way that a regulatory 
restriction simply does not.  Land, if not valuable for the use for which the 
government took it, may be sold or put to another use.  A land use restriction simply 
cannot be repurposed in this way—if the restriction turns out not to be worth the 
costs it imposes, the government’s only option is to repeal it, retaining no future 
value to enjoy.  Moreover, the benefit of the use is generally not experienced by the 
government itself, but by owners of other property.  Situations in which the 
restriction is the equivalent of an easement for the government’s own use are far 
more likely to be held to be takings.  See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 
YALE L.J. 36, 47 (1964) (positing that “state courts have quite uniformly rejected” 
appropriations in the guise of restrictions “and required the payment of 
compensation”). 
 44. The municipality might make up the difference by increasing the local tax 
rate, but such increases would be uniform across properties, so that the yield from 
the restricted property would still be proportionately lower. 
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land use restrictions also affect income and sales taxes.45  If 
residential purposes are restricted or the property becomes less 
desirable for them, fewer or less wealthy people, who will pay lower 
income taxes, will live there.  If lucrative industrial or commercial 
purposes are prohibited, corporate and employee income taxes will 
go down.  Finally, if retail purposes are restricted or become less 
profitable on the property, sales taxes will drop accordingly.  As 
discussed in the next Section, a number of factors distort the cost 
signals of these taxes and whether the same government that enacts 
the land use restriction is the one that feels the restriction’s effects.  
Despite this, some government always and already feels the cost of 
restrictions on property. 
The cost experienced by the government is, of course, not the 
same as that experienced by the property owner.  But neither is the 
benefit.  Both the cost and the benefit reflect the percentage of value 
reached by taxation, and (assuming that tax rates accurately capture 
value and income, an assumption discussed further below) the sum 
should reflect the overall economic impact of the action on social 
welfare.  Requiring governments to compensate owners directly for the 
loss, in contrast, adds an extraneous cost that is usually significantly 
larger than, and has little to do with, the social welfare impact of the 
restriction and may therefore deter otherwise efficient regulations. 
Consider this extremely simplified example:  assume that residents 
of Anytown are taxed at 1% of the value of their properties annually, 
and that a new zoning restriction lowers the fair market value of 
Blackacre by 20%, from $100,000 to $80,000.  The owner of 
Blackacre immediately loses $20,000 in value, while the government 
will only lose $200 in revenue in the first year reflecting this change.  
If the zoning restriction raises the value of surrounding properties, 
taxation will also only capture that value at a rate of 1% a year.  Say 
the zoning restriction raises the value of twenty surrounding 
properties by $5000 each, for a total of $100,000, or a net gain of 
$80,000 in property value.  The government will recoup $1000 per 
year of this benefit, for a net gain of $800.  Thus, although the net 
impact of the property restriction on social welfare is not the same as 
the impact on governmental revenue, the coefficient will be the same 
for each.  An overall efficient change will have an overall positive 
impact on governmental budgets, while an overall inefficient change 
will have a negative impact. 
                                                          
 45. See BOWMAN & PAGANO, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing land use strategies to 
maximize particular kinds of taxes). 
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Now imagine the impact if Anytown is forced, as advocates of 
expansion of regulatory takings urge, to pay the owner of Blackacre 
for the reduction in value to the property.  In the first year after the 
restriction, the government loses both the reduction in taxable value 
($200) and the cost of compensation ($20,000), but only gains $1000, 
for a net loss of $19,200.  Although the overall benefit will still be 
$800 for future years, it will be twenty-five years before the 
government breaks even on this restriction, by which point the 
positive impact on governmental revenue may well be wiped out by 
the cost of financing the initial $20,000 compensation. 
Across the range of cases, the length of time necessary for a 
government to reap the benefits of an efficient restriction will 
depend on multiple factors:  the tax rate, the amount of 
compensation necessary, the cost of generating the initial lump sum 
award to the property owner, any independent change in property 
value, and the relative gains and losses from the restriction.46  But, 
except in extreme cases, the governmental incentives are very 
different in a regime that requires compensation for land use 
restrictions.  A restriction that is efficient as a matter of overall social 
welfare no longer makes as much sense as a matter of governmental 
revenue.  A government motivated by its budget might well choose to 
forgo the restriction in order to avoid paying compensation, and 
property regulation would be less efficient as a result. 
This hypothetical example does not take into account the 
transaction costs in finding those experiencing loss as a result of the 
restriction, determining the amount of the loss, and paying the 
compensation.  All of these additional costs will make restricting land 
use with a compensation requirement an even less attractive 
proposition.47  In contrast, there are no additional transaction costs 
involved in taxation.  Although setting and collecting taxes is costly 
and cumbersome, both cost and cumber exist whether or not 
compensation is required for regulatory restrictions. 
C. Conclusion 
Requiring compensation for regulatory restrictions does not dispel 
fiscal illusion—it creates it.  Fully compensating the owners whose 
property loses value as a result of land use restrictions has nothing to 
                                                          
 46. See Pecorino, supra note 40, at 274 (showing the costs of fulfilling 
compensation requirements). 
 47. Cf. Michelman, supra note 19, at 1214–15, 1214 n.99 (discussing ways that 
finding and settling claims for compensation affect a measure’s gains). 
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do with accurate balancing of costs and benefits.  Governments do 
not receive the value that is lost by the owner directly; instead, they 
receive only a fraction of that value through the amount recouped in 
increased tax revenues or saved in taxpayer-funded services.  But 
governments also experience a decrease in revenues proportionate to 
any losses property owners experience.  In a nondiscriminatory and 
accurate system of taxation, actions that have a positive economic 
impact will increase governmental revenue while those that have a 
negative impact will decrease revenue.  To the extent governments 
react to these revenue changes, they do not need compensation 
requirements to dispel the illusion that land use restrictions are 
costless.  Adding a compensation requirement, in contrast, distorts 
the cost signal that taxation already provides. 
Will this realization make governments enact only measures that 
maximize economic welfare?  Not necessarily.  Sadly, governmental 
actors, like the rest of us, lack crystal balls foretelling which measures 
will produce wealth and prosperity.  All they can do is guess, and 
their guesses are sometimes very bad.  Also, governmental actors, 
perhaps even more than the rest of us, are motivated by many things 
beyond maximizing revenues.48  They may support measures that are 
bad economics because they are good politics and will win votes even 
if they lose money.  They may also support measures that serve policy 
goals without regard to their ultimate economic impact.  Economic 
arguments are helpful in environmental protection or affordable 
housing debates, for example, but are less important in securing their 
passage than other convictions.  But the fiscal illusion argument is 
built on the assumption that policymakers should and do care about 
maximizing fiscal returns.  Taken on its own terms, the argument 
makes no sense. 
II. THE TAX/LAND USE FEEDBACK LOOP AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
Governments raise revenue in many ways, and property use affects 
most of them.  Property taxes are affected by the value of the 
property, sales taxes by the sales connected with the property, and 
income taxes by how attractive the property is for profitable 
businesses and higher-income employees and residents.  As legal 
changes affect the importance of any one of these forms of taxation, 
governments turn to others to make up lost revenue.  Limits on 
municipal property taxation, for example, lead local governments to 
                                                          
 48. See discussion infra Part III. 
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compete for local sales or income taxes and other fees, or to rely on 
state revenues, themselves derived from sales and income taxes, to 
make up shortfalls.49 
Changes in property value have different impacts on different taxes 
and governments.  Municipal governments, which enact most land 
use restrictions, are most sensitive to changes in property taxes, while 
federal and state governments are most sensitive to changes in 
income taxation.  By contrast, state and, to a lesser extent, municipal 
governments are most sensitive to changes in sales taxes.  Features of 
various tax systems may also distort the accuracy with which 
assessment value reflects property value.  Nevertheless, this section 
shows that various taxes should ultimately communicate much of the 
economic impact of land use restrictions to each of the jurisdictions 
in which the property is located. 
A. Real Property Taxes 
The impact of land use restrictions has the most direct and 
transparent effect on real property taxes.  Real property taxes are 
levied in every state and are a tremendously important source of 
revenue.50  Property taxes range from over 40% of all revenue in 
many northeastern states to only 11% of revenue in Alaska, which 
relies heavily on mineral extraction fees and royalties.51  Property 
taxes are particularly important for local governments:  property 
taxes make up over 70% of local tax revenue.52  Although both states 
and municipalities rely more heavily on other sources of revenue 
than they did before the property tax revolts of the 1970s, property 
taxes remain the most significant source of tax revenue for state and 
local governments.53 
Property taxes are a function of the assessed value of the property 
at issue, multiplied by the assessment rate, multiplied by the rate at 
                                                          
 49. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
 50. YOUNGMAN, supra note 43, at ix (stating that “[t]he property tax is a mainstay 
of independent local revenue in this country,” whose annual totals far exceed the 
corporate income tax); Ryan Forster & Kail Padgitt, Where Do State and Local 
Governments Get Their Tax Revenue?, 242 FISCAL FACT 1, 4–5 (2010), 
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff242.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See JEFFREY L. BARNETT ET AL., 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS:  FINANCE—STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/l 
ocal/summary_report.pdf (reporting that property taxes made up 73.5% of local tax 
revenue in 2012). 
 53. See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 55, 58 (discussing the decline in reliance on 
property taxes). 
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which the value is taxed, called the millage rate.54  Assessment is most 
often conducted by municipalities, although states have varying levels 
of control and involvement in assessment.55  Assessment itself is based 
on the sales prices of comparable properties, replacement cost, or 
income stream of the property, or some combination of the three.56  
With the exception of replacement cost, each of these factors is 
directly affected by restrictions on the use of the property.  Indeed, 
claims for takings compensation for regulatory restrictions generally 
rest on either the reduced expected sales price or income stream 
from the property.57 
A number of factors affect the extent to which assessed value 
accurately reflects the impact of land use restrictions.  Some factors 
are the result of various exemptions and limitations on property taxes 
imposed as a result of widespread protests against property taxes in 
the 1970s.58  Many of these measures draw differences between 
business and residential, particularly owner-occupied, properties.59  
More than half of states have homestead exemptions reducing the 
taxes on properties occupied as the owner’s primary residence.60  
Many other states prevent property taxes from exceeding a certain 
percentage of the owner’s annual income.61  A number of other states 
                                                          
 54. E.g., MANDY RAFOOL, A GUIDE TO PROPERTY TAXES:  AN OVERVIEW 8–9 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 7–8 (breaking down the assessment responsibility in each state). 
 56. Jennifer J.S. Brooks & Ronald J. Schultz, Market Theory:  An Approach to Real 
Property Valuation for State and Local Tax Purposes, 45 TAX LAW. 339, 339–40 (1992). 
 57. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (alleging takings 
based on different in value if he could fill in and develop his wetland property versus 
its value with the restriction); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 
(1926) (arguing that regulation amounted to a taking because property was worth 
$10,000 per acre if it could be used for industrial purposes versus $2500 per acre if 
restricted to residential purposes). 
 58. Property taxes are extremely visible to taxpayers.  Unlike most income taxes, 
property taxes are not deducted from an income stream or calculated as a portion of 
an overall tax bill.  Rather, owners receive a separate bill for property taxes, often 
twice a year.  If individuals choose not to pay, governments may foreclose on their 
homes.  Property taxes also need not reflect ability to pay; those who own property as 
a residence receive no additional income when the value of their property increases.  
Particularly for those on a fixed income, increased taxes as a result of increased 
assessed value impose a serious hardship.  In response to such inequities and other 
protests, states have enacted a number of measures that distort the relationship 
between taxation and assessed value.  See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 56–58; Edward A. 
Zelinsky, The Once and Future Property Tax:  A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2201–03, 2216 (2002) (discussing changes to property tax). 
 59. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58, 63–64. 
 60. Id. at 63–64. 
 61. Id. at 64. 
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grant deferrals of property taxes for elderly or disabled owners until 
the property is sold, although few of those eligible take advantage of 
the deferrals.62  Many states also create different assessment rates for 
different kinds of properties, often taxing homeowners and farmers 
on a smaller percentage of the assessed value than that on which 
businesses are taxed.63 
Each of these measures might be expected to make governments 
less sensitive to measures that affect the assessed value of residential, 
as opposed to business, properties.  Nevertheless, governmental 
reliance on residential property taxes has only grown since the 
1970s.64  Factors behind this trend may include greater difficulty in 
assessing business property, greater reliance by businesses on 
equipment rather than real property, and negotiated tax reductions 
for new businesses expected to contribute to economic 
development.65  So although changes in value may affect the tax levy 
on different kinds of property in different ways, restrictions that 
affect the value of different kinds of properties will in most cases also 
affect property taxes. 
An additional limitation lies in the accuracy of assessed value.  
Because assessments rely on the assessor’s estimate of what the 
property will sell for, and because individual properties may differ in 
many ways even from neighboring properties, there is much room for 
error.  Inconsistencies in assessed values are notorious.66  Some of 
these differences are random.  Others are the result of systemic 
differences.  Studies have found systemic undervaluation of high value 
residences and overvaluation of low cost properties; lower valuation of 
owner-occupied versus rental properties; and even overvaluation of 
properties in majority-minority versus majority-white neighborhoods.67 
If there were truly no relationship between assessed value and true 
value, there would be no reason for property taxes to reflect the 
impact of land use restrictions.  But, of course, there is a significant 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 64–65. 
 63. RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 8. 
 64. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58; see also Byron Lutz et al., The Housing Crisis and 
State and Local Government Tax Revenue:  Five Channels, 41 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 
306, 308 (2011) (reporting that residential property makes up about 60% of assessed 
value). 
 65. BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 58. 
 66. Id. at 57; see also Lee Harris, ‘Assessing’ Discrimination:  The Influence of Race in 
Residential Property Tax Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (discussing 
the systematic differences in property valuation across racial lines). 
 67. See Harris, supra note 66, at 12 (examining the racial dynamics underlying the 
disparities in property tax assessments). 
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relationship, even if the relationship is not perfect.68  The kind of 
differences caused by land use restrictions are also relatively easy to 
assess.  Unlike the different feel and attractiveness from one block to 
another, prohibitions on building more than one home per acre, for 
example, or on industrial use, have clear and comparatively easy to 
monetize impacts.69  Land use restrictions also do not fall within the 
known categories of systemic overassessment, such as low value, 
commercial, renter-occupied properties.70 
Another potential limit on the sensitivity of governmental decision 
makers to changes in property value comes from lag times between 
assessments.  If property need not be reassessed regularly, 
governments may enjoy long periods without experiencing revenue 
changes from reductions in property value.  Although eventually the 
change will affect tax revenues, in the interim the situation might 
appear to be closer to the something-for-nothing that advocates of 
the fiscal illusion construct posit.  If the cost is delayed, however, so is 
the benefit; the government will not experience any tax gains from 
increased value of other properties until reassessment is complete 
either.71  Widespread decreases in assessment times over recent 
decades also mitigate this problem.72  Today, reassessment is 
mandated every year in twenty-five states; in most others, 
reassessment is required between every two and four years.73  There 
are outliers—Rhode Island requires reassessment every ten years; 
North Carolina, every eight years; and California, under Proposition 
13, requires reassessment only when property is sold.74  But in most 
states owners are entitled to regular reassessments. 
The availability of appeals provides another safeguard to ensure 
that assessments reflect the impact of restrictions that decrease 
                                                          
 68. See Justin M. Ross & Wenli Yan, Fiscal Illusion from Property Reassessment?  An 
Empirical Test of the Residual View, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 9 (2013) (noting high correlation 
between property tax revenues and housing prices). 
 69. In fact, state and local governments regularly do monetize such impacts by 
reducing property taxes on land dedicated to open space, wilderness, or farming 
purposes. Because such easements are only exchanged with governments or 
charities, however, and not on the open market, there is concern that such 
easements are overvalued.  Eagle, supra note 43, at 69–70. 
 70. If anything, downzoning, restrictions on commercial uses, and environmental 
protections are more likely in the high value, owner-occupied areas that are more 
likely to be underassessed already.  Harris, supra note 66, at 12. 
 71. RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 6. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 6–7. 
 74. Id. 
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property value.  Assessment appeals are rare—occurring in just 2% of 
assessments according to one early study75—but are low cost and 
readily available to the disgruntled property owner.76  For the owner 
significantly aggrieved by a land use restriction, the assessment appeal 
presents an easy partial remedy. 
The most important limitation of the impact of land use restrictions 
on property taxes is that they are primarily municipal taxes.  Many 
states collect taxes on particular kinds of property, such as railroad 
rights-of-way;77 a number commandeer some municipal taxes to fund 
school revenue equalization schemes; and a few collect and distribute 
most property tax revenues directly.78  In general, however, property 
taxes fund municipal budgets, not state ones, and certainly not federal 
ones.  Municipal governments will, therefore, be most sensitive to the 
impact any land use restrictions have on property taxes, state 
governments less so, and federal governments hardly at all. 
But what one level of government loses, other governments and 
other tax sources must make up.79  In particular, when local revenues 
decrease, state support increases.  The limitations on property taxes in 
recent decades have been accompanied by sharply increased state 
support for local governments.80  States, in turn, have increased their 
reliance on other forms of revenue, particularly individual and 
corporate income taxes.81  Still, property taxes compete with sales taxes 
                                                          
 75. THEODORE REYNOLDS SMITH, REAL PROPERTY TAXATION AND THE URBAN 
CENTER:  A CASE STUDY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 46 (1972). 
 76. See RAFOOL, supra note 54, at 11 (describing the elements of the appeals 
process common to most states, including that property owners generally may simply 
call the assessor’s office). 
 77. Id. at 13. 
 78. Id. at 4–5. 
 79. See generally John Joseph Wallis, A History of the Property Tax in America, in 
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. LOWELL 
HARRISS 123, 127–28 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (describing a shift between 
different types and levels of taxation over U.S. history). 
 80. See BRUNORI, supra note 13, at 65–66 (discussing the significant increase in 
state funding for local schools over the past quarter century). 
 81. Between 1948 and 2010, sales taxes as a percentage of state and local 
revenues have remained almost the same.  See Liz Malm & Ellen Kant, The Sources of 
State and Local Tax Revenues, TAX FOUND. tbl.2 (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local-tax-revenues (showing that 
individual and corporate income taxes increased from 8.5% of state and local 
revenues to 23.9% between 1948 and 2010). 
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as the single largest source of state and local tax revenue82 and have 
increased in importance as state sales taxes decreased in recent years.83 
In short, both state and local governments will experience real 
budgetary effects from land use restrictions that affect property 
values.  While these are not precisely proportional to or simultaneous 
with those felt by property owners, they are significant enough to 
undercut any false impression that the actions are costless, and 
accurate enough to signal what those costs and benefits actually are. 
B. Income Taxes 
Land use restrictions also frequently affect income taxes.  In 
contrast to property taxes, federal and, to a lesser extent, state 
governments will be most sensitive to these impacts.  The impact of 
property restrictions on income taxes is neither as direct nor as 
transparent as the effect on property taxes, but is particularly clear 
for the kinds of land use measures likely to be imposed by non-
municipal governments. 
Land use measures affect income taxes in many ways.  Changing 
the value of the property obviously changes the income produced on 
sale of the property, but the effects are much more pervasive.  
Restricting property to residential uses prevents the property itself 
from generating income except as rental property.  Increasing 
minimum lot sizes generally leads to higher-income property 
owners.84  Prohibiting development of a property to achieve 
environmental goals may undermine almost all of its income-
producing potential. 
The impact of such measures on income taxes is more difficult to 
calculate than the impact on property taxes.  Income taxes, after all, are 
not based on property value.85  In addition, because many local 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. (showing property taxes outpacing sales taxes in 2010); NATIONAL 
TOTALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, BY TYPE OF TAX, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU tbl.1 (June 21, 2016) [hereinafter STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX 
REVENUE], http://www2.census.gov/govs/qtax/2016/q1t1.xls (showing property 
taxes were significantly larger than sales or income taxes in 2013 and 2014). 
 84. Fencing out low-income residents may even be the purpose of such 
restrictions.  See REG’L PLANNING ASS’N & LINCOLN LAND INST., FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY 
TAX REFORM:  LAND USE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW JERSEY’S TAX DEBATE 7–8 (2005) 
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM] (finding that municipalities use 
their zoning and taxing power to restrict affordable housing). 
 85. The income of a wealthy person residing in a hovel, for example, will be 
taxed at the same rate as that same person residing in a mansion.  A fabulously 
successful restaurant in a hole-in-the-wall on Manhattan’s Avenue C is taxed at the 
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governments lack the ability to levy income taxes, they will generally not be 
sensitive to the effects on income except as a proxy for other qualities. 
Quite a number of local governments, however, particularly larger 
ones, do levy a small income tax.86  All Indiana and Maryland counties, 
for example; over six hundred Iowa school districts; hundreds of Ohio 
school districts and cities; twenty-three Michigan cities; plus a number 
of major cities, like New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, levy an 
income tax.87  One comprehensive study shows that cities with the 
ability to levy employee or corporate income taxes aggressively tailor 
land use strategies to maximize such taxes, particularly because they 
often fall on non-residents (and therefore non-voters).88  But these 
jurisdictions still represent a minority,89 and local governments get 
most of their revenue from property taxes and state transfers. 
This is not to say that municipalities do not care about the income 
of their residents and businesses—successful businesses and wealthy 
residents generally raise property values and, with them, property taxes.  
Poorer residents and those with children often require more 
government services, demanding more governmental outlay.90  
Therefore, municipalities often try to exclude low-income residents91 
and solicit successful businesses.92  But in general, concern about 
income taxes per se does not generate these desires; in fact, 
                                                          
same rate as an equally successful restaurant on Fifth Avenue.  In fact, the effective 
income tax rate for taxpayers with less valuable property might be even higher 
because they will have lower deductions for mortgage interest, business expenses, 
and the like. 
 86. Joseph Henchman, County and City Income Taxes Clustered in States with Poor 
Tax Climates, TAX FOUND. (July 11, 2008), http://taxfoundation.org/article/county-
and-city-income-taxes-clustered-states-poor-tax-climates. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See BOWMAN & PAGANO, supra note 16, at 70–78 (discussing land use strategies 
of cities with income taxes). 
 89. See id. at 50 (reporting that out of 555 cities with populations over 50,000, 
only 8% had the ability to levy an income tax). 
 90. See FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 8 (reporting that 
over half of New Jersey’s expenditures are on educating school-age children). 
 91. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 
718 (N.J. 1975) (noting the municipality’s concession that “its land use regulation 
was intended to result and has resulted in economic discrimination and exclusion” 
and argument that “its policies and practices are in the best present and future fiscal 
interest of the municipality”). 
 92. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:  Commerce Clause 
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 378 (1996) 
(discussing the unproductive battle to lure businesses with subsidies). 
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municipalities often give up part of the property, sales, and income taxes 
they would otherwise receive to lure businesses to relocate there.93 
The reverse is true for the federal government.  Between personal 
income taxes (47%), corporate income taxes (11%), and payroll 
taxes (33%), in 2015, 91% of federal government tax revenue came 
from income.94  The multiplicity of exceptions and deductions in the 
federal tax code makes it difficult to calculate a one-to-one 
relationship between income and taxation.  Nevertheless, federal 
policymakers are extremely concerned (though not in agreement) 
about the impact of various measures on income taxes.95 
What is more, federal land use measures are more likely to have 
foreseeable impacts on income than the classic use and area 
restrictions enacted by local governments.  One might (overstating it 
quite a bit) even say this is a constitutional requirement.  Under the 
main provision authorizing federal land use restrictions, the activity 
restricted must impact interstate commerce.96  And even though 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence defines both “interstate” and 
“commerce” broadly,97 the federal government is unlikely for political 
reasons to intervene regarding land uses that do not have significant 
monetary impacts.  Consider some of the main federal land use 
restrictions—New Deal Era agricultural adjustment programs; 
Endangered Species Act habitat protections; Clean Water Act 
restrictions on filling wetlands; Coastal Management Act regulation 
of building on coastlines; and standards governing siting of airports, 
                                                          
 93. See id. at 384–85 (reviewing tax incentives for businesses); Mark Taylor, Note, 
A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 669, 675–77 (1994) 
(describing tax incentives to induce businesses to relocate). 
 94. Policy Basics:  Where Do Federal Tax Revenues Come from?, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-
where-do-federal-tax-revenues-come-from. 
 95. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX 
REFORM IN THE 114TH CONGRESS:  AN OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS 2 (2016), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43060.pdf (characterizing the ongoing income 
tax debate as centered around reforming or repealing various tax expenditures). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 97. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(discussing the “expansive” power over interstate commerce activities under the 
Commerce Clause); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219, 236 (1948) (“[I]t is enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a 
general practice . . . contains a threat to the interstate economy that requires 
preventative regulation.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (stating that the 
commerce power “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the [C]onstitution”). 
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telecommunications towers, and nuclear power facilities.98  All have 
clear impacts on income, even if their magnitude and whether the 
overall impact is positive or negative is subject to debate. 
States will fall somewhere in between local and federal 
governments in their sensitivity to income tax impacts.  Individual 
and corporate income taxes rose to make up about 28% of state and 
local revenues in 2000.99  Greater reliance on property taxes in the 
face of first rising housing prices, and then plummeting income,100 
has reduced tax’s impact on revenue.  However, income taxes still 
comprise a significant portion of state revenues.101 
Similarly, state planning measures fall somewhere between federal 
and local ones with respect to the clarity of their impact on income.  
In general, states have delegated their authority regarding land use to 
municipal governments rather than exercising it directly.102  Many of 
the state measures that do exist intervene to prevent local land use 
restrictions that have undesirable statewide impacts, such as zoning 
laws that exclude affordable housing103 or restrictions that prevent 
construction of solar panels and other alternative energy sources.104  
But others resemble federal measures that prohibit or encourage 
broad changes to land use in ways that predictably affect income.105  
Many of these are through programs mandated by or coordinated 
with federal law, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act and 
                                                          
 98. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism:  Into the 
Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 268–90 (2012) (summarizing federal measures 
affecting land use); Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, 
Briefly, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 73–79 (2005) (same). 
 99. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2. 
 100. See Lutz et al., supra note 64, at 306 (discussing why property taxes remain 
relatively stable in times of economic decline). 
 101. See Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2 (showing income taxes comprising 24% 
of state and local tax revenue in 2010); STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, 
supra note 83, tbl.1 (showing income taxes as the same share of state and local tax 
revenue in 2014 and 2015). 
 102. Salkin, supra note 98, at 257. 
 103. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2016) (permitting override of local 
decisions barring affordable housing); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23 
(LexisNexis 2016) (same). 
 104. See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1242–44 (2009) 
(discussing state laws that address land use restrictions that pose obstacles to 
alternative energy). 
 105. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1424 (2012) 
(discussing federal requirements that restrict the development of private property). 
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Clean Water Act.106  Other programs with significant impacts on land 
use, including regulations regarding fracking or public 
transportation investments, are in part driven by their impact on 
income and other tax revenue.107 
C. Sales Taxes 
Sales taxes are a very significant source of revenue for state 
governments and sometimes a significant source of revenue for local 
governments.  Reliance on state and local sales taxation varies inversely 
with other taxes.  Restrictions on non-residential uses, big box stores, 
shopping plazas, and the like obviously affect state and local sales taxes, 
while restrictions on population density do so less directly. 
Sales taxes comprise about a third of combined state and local 
revenues.108  As the role of property taxes shrank over the course of 
the twentieth century, the role of sales taxes grew, until sales taxes 
comprised a slightly larger portion of state tax revenue.109  Since the 
2008 recession, the importance of sales and property taxes has 
flipped; in 2014 sales tax revenue was about 75% of property tax 
revenue.110  Reliance on sales and income taxes are also often 
inversely related—for example, Washington, which has no state 
income tax, has one of the highest sales tax rates, while neighboring 
Oregon has no general sales tax,111 but one of the highest income tax 
rates in the nation.112 
Local governments in thirty-eight states collect sales taxes.113  Such 
taxes are particularly important in states with low property tax 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 1424–34 (discussing various federal laws influencing state land use 
decisions). 
 107. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Conn., Gov. Malloy:  Funding for 
Transformative Transportation Plan Now Underway (July 28, 2015), 
http://portal.ct.gov/Departments_and_Agencies/Office_of_the_Governor/Press_R
oom/Press_Releases/2015/07-
2015/Gov__Malloy__Funding_for_Transformative_Transportation_Plan_Now_Unde
rway/ (“Improving transportation is fundamental to strong economic and market 
growth.” (quoting Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman)). 
 108. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, fig.1. 
 109. Id. tbl.2. 
 110. STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, supra note 83, tbl.1. 
 111. Scott Drenkard & Jared Walczak, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2015, TAX 
FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-
rates-2015. 
 112. Jared Walczak, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2015, TAX 
FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-individual-income-
tax-rates-and-brackets-2015. 
 113. Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 111. 
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collections.  Alabama, for example, with some of the lowest property 
tax collections,114 also has the highest average local sales taxes, and 
one of the highest combined state-local sales tax rates.115  Similarly, 
after California passed Proposition 13, which significantly limited 
local property taxes, local officials shifted their development 
planning toward attracting businesses that generated sales taxes.116  A 
1999 survey of government officials in California found that they 
ranked sales taxes as either the first or second most important factor 
in considering new developments.117  Impacts on sales taxes are thus 
an important land use factor for the large number of municipalities 
with sales tax authority. 
D. Conclusion 
In general, governments will feel the positive or negative impact of land 
use measures through tax revenues.  Localities experience these impacts 
significantly through property and often sales taxes and, less frequently, 
through income taxes.  Federal governments experience them directly 
only through income tax revenues, but most federal land restrictions raise 
obvious potential income effects.  States will feel the effects of land use 
restrictions on all three forms of taxation, although states have delegated 
much of their land use authority to municipalities. 
The tax feedback loop is not perfect.  Tax deductions and 
exemptions mean taxes often fail to capture the value of the asset 
taxed, limit the accuracy of the signal, and add complexity to the 
system, making it more difficult to perceive the relationship between 
impacts on value and impacts on revenue.  In addition, some 
measures may increase the value taxed by one government but 
decrease the value taxed by another.  Imagine, for example, a local 
government measure that prohibits commercial uses, which increases 
property values and therefore local property taxes, but decreases sales 
and therefore state sales taxes.  However, this example is a failing of 
compensation requirements as well because compensation is paid 
only by one level of government, but the negative or positive impact 
of that property restriction may be felt by another government 
                                                          
 114. Malm & Kant, supra note 81, tbl.2 (showing Alabama as one of the five states 
with the lowest reliance on property tax revenues). 
 115. Drenkard & Walczak, supra note 111 (listing Alabama with the highest local sales 
tax rate in the country, and one of five highest combined local-state sales tax rates). 
 116. Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13:  Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and 
the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 199–200 (1997). 
 117. Robert W. Wassmer, Fiscalisation of Land Use, Urban Growth Boundaries and 
Non-Central Retail Sprawl in the Western United States, 39 URB. STUD. 1307, 1317 (2002). 
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entirely.  If the goal is to use fiscal incentives to get the government 
to maximize wealth within a jurisdiction, the tax system is as close to 
an accurate means to internalize costs and benefits as that 
jurisdiction is going to get. 
III. DO GOVERNMENTS CARE ABOUT REVENUE IMPACTS? 
The preceding Section takes the cost-internalization argument on 
its own terms, accepting its premises that policymakers actually care 
about, and are motivated by, governmental revenues.  As others have 
written, there is good reason to believe that these premises are false.118  
Maximizing governmental revenue is only tangentially related to most 
political goals, and the structure of political decision making often 
divorces those who make land use decisions from those who have to 
pay for them.  Nevertheless, enhancing revenues is a basic planning 
goal, one that state and particularly local governments actively pursue.  
Understanding the tax feedback loop also helps to explain why the 
compensation requirements for regulatory restrictions enacted in 
some jurisdictions have so effectively blocked such restrictions:  even 
when the action will produce more economic gains than losses, one-to-
one compensation is usually so much higher than the government’s 
share of those gains that withdrawing the restriction is the only 
rational choice.  This Section discusses the extent of, and limitations 
on, governmental sensitivity to financial incentives. 
A. Governments Often Won’t Care Much About Tax Revenues 
The fiscal illusionists’ assumption—that revenue impacts will 
significantly impact political behavior—ignores both the theory and 
reality of government decision making.  A number of scholars have 
examined these shortfalls.119  This Section briefly reviews the reasons 
that governments often do not care about the revenue impacts of 
land use restrictions. 
First, it is a mistake to attribute the private actor’s desire to 
maximize revenues to the self-interested political actor.  
                                                          
 118. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 31 (1991). 
 119. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 38, at 279–80 (examining the political impact of 
compensation); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent 
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2006) (discussing the ways that politics influence 
eminent domain practice); Levinson, supra note 14, at 345–47 (arguing that 
compensation requirements do not impact governments in the same way they impact 
private firms). 
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Governmental representatives are not like pure economic actors, 
whose interests are neatly aligned with the profits of their firms.  
Public choice theory, the primary economic theory regarding 
political decision making, posits that governmental actors are less 
interested in maximizing governmental budgets than in maximizing 
political power and securing reelection.120  Although beliefs about the 
public interest clearly play a role as well,121 those who can most 
powerfully express their sense of the public interest will have the 
greatest influence on such beliefs.  The most politically effective 
actions in this light are not those that maximize benefit across a 
broad group, but rather those that significantly affect a smaller group 
of actors that is more highly motivated and can more easily 
coordinate to act on its concerns, and which can therefore more 
effectively command public attention.122  Daniel Farber has even 
argued that, in some cases, failing to compensate may result in more 
political pressure than will compensating because failure to 
compensate will make owners more active in decrying their perceived 
wrongs and make their cries more sympathetic to the public.123 
In addition, policy-setting, implementation, and budget 
management responsibilities are often divided among different 
entities:  sometimes within the same government, sometimes by the 
same entity at different periods of time, and sometimes by different 
entities—municipal, state, federal, or regional—altogether.124  The 
people that cause revenue changes, in other words, may not be the same 
people that experience the impact of those changes, limiting the effect 
of such impacts on political behavior.125  Zoning and planning decisions, 
for example, are made in the first instance by a planning commission, 
then ratified by the general government, and then may be implemented 
by a separate zoning board or board of adjustment.126  Neither the 
                                                          
 120. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 118, at 20–22, 31; Levinson, supra note 14, at 374. 
 121. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 118, at 29–33 (arguing that politicians’ 
ideologies influence their actions). 
 122. Farber, supra note 38, at 289–90 (analyzing reasons that “small groups with 
high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the political process”). 
 123. Id. at 299; see also Brennan & Boyd, supra note 40, at 190 (calculating 
compensation necessary to produce efficiency—generating political action). 
 124. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 119, at 141–42 (noting that local economic 
development projects are often funded by state and federal governments). 
 125. Levinson, supra note 14, at 380 (explaining that the decision makers are 
often bureaucrats rather than elected officials). 
 126. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & 
EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER, PROPERTY LAW:  RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 429 (6th 
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planning commission nor the board of adjustment, responsible 
respectively for determining the rules and whether individual owners 
comply with them, will be responsible for distributing funds between 
schools, police, garbage collection, or the many other demands on 
municipal revenues.  A similar division of responsibility affects other 
levels of government.  Congress may enact a broad mandate, the 
relevant agency will implement it, and a wholly different agency may feel 
the revenue impact of the action.127  Revenue shortfalls, moreover, need 
not block governmental action to the extent another government will 
finance its operation at an own-revenue deficit.128 
Even when the entities making, implementing, and paying for a 
land use measure are closely aligned, the individual actors may not be 
because there may be a lag time in realizing the costs and benefits of 
a certain land use decision.  A government official may leave office, 
or face an election in which the official has to explain the decision, 
long before the community or government realizes the tax benefits of 
the decision.  Nor will costs and benefits necessarily be realized on 
the same schedule.  A measure preventing development of wetlands, 
for example, will immediately and significantly reduce the market 
value of a parcel but only slowly produce economic benefits by 
avoiding impacts on drinking water and avoiding costly protection 
and remediation of areas subject to flooding.  A decision maker’s 
calculus, therefore, will rationally depend far more on the voices of 
aggrieved homeowners and environmental advocates than the 
promise of far off increased revenues.  Indeed, that is perhaps how it 
should be:  as high as the economy is on the list of public concerns, 
bean-counter kings are unlikely to create the kind of society in which 
most of us want to live. 
Again, all of these challenges may be levied equally powerfully at the 
fiscal illusionists.  Their arguments depend on the assumption that 
making governments pay will cause governments to internalize costs and 
make efficient decisions.  This Section summarizes some of the many 
reasons to doubt this assumption.  The questions about whether requiring 
                                                          
ed. 2014) (describing the institutions involved in zoning code enactment and 
implementation). 
 127. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., for 
example, is implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency, but revenue 
effects of compensation would be shared with those agencies, like Health and 
Human Services or the Department of Defense, with large budgets that are 
frequently subject to appropriations battles. 
 128. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 382 (stating that compensation may be paid 
from a general fund rather than the budget of the agency deciding to take the action). 
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compensation for land use decisions will lead to more efficient decisions 
are thus another reason to question the fiscal illusion argument. 
B. Sometimes Governments Do Care About Tax Revenues—But That’s Not 
Always a Good Thing 
While impacts on tax revenues are unlikely to be the primary 
determinant of land use decisions, these impacts are an important 
motivator, particularly for local governments.  This Section discusses 
both governmental sensitivity to revenue and its potential negative 
consequences. 
Local governments, which are most likely to make decisions 
affecting land use, are also the most sensitive to the tax impacts of 
their decisions.  Part II suggested that because the connection 
between taxes and land use measures is the most direct and 
transparent for property taxes, local governments will be most 
sensitive to the cost-internalization mechanism that taxes provide.  
The political economy factors discussed above will work differently 
for smaller local governments.  Because municipal decisions are 
readily capitalized into property values and property taxes,129 
homeowners are far more aware and involved than either renters or 
voters in federal, state, or large city governments.130  Officials in these 
communities, therefore, are extremely responsive to “homevoter” 
interests in maintaining overall community property values and 
property tax burdens, and their decisions reflect this fact.131  Land use 
plans from across the country cite increasing tax revenue and 
reducing tax burden among their planning concerns,132 and 
                                                          
 129. FISCHEL, HOMEOWNER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 39–40. 
 130. Id. at 4. 
 131. Id. at 89; cf. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation:  Are Homevoters 
Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 229, 231–32 (2014) 
(providing evidence that these values even impact land use decisions in New York 
City, perhaps the polar opposite of the small municipalities Fischel focuses on). 
 132. See, e.g., HOKE COUNTY LAND USE PLAN, at I.3–4, A-32 (2005), 
http://www.hokecounty.net/DocumentCenter/View/63 (noting that “land uses that 
typically generate high tax values and collections but demand little in public services 
are industrial and commercial activities” and that “[c]apturing sales tax revenue is 
essential for guaranteeing a growing revenue stream for local government budgets”); 
LAND USE PLAN:  PLATTE COUNTY, MISSOURI, at 3–5 (2010), https://static1.squarespace 
.com/static/564a1160e4b082647c602a40/t/566867f4df40f3a42f45b175/1449682932
498/2010_land_use_plan.pdf (discussing tax opportunities of increased retail sales); 
LAND USE PLAN:  ROCK ISLAND COUNTY, ILLINOIS, at 6, 16, 24 (1998), 
http://www.rockislandcounty.org/uploadedFiles/landuse98.pdf (discussing the 
discrepancy between tax revenue and additional costs of new housing as impetus for 
plan); MONTCO 2040:  A SHARED VISION, THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR MONTGOMERY 
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numerous studies demonstrate the connection between land use 
patterns and hoped-for tax consequences.133 
Sensitivity to revenue impacts does not necessarily lead to better 
land use decisions.  In fact, the small size that creates this sensitivity 
also makes local governments less likely to fully internalize the costs 
of their decisions because there is more spillover across municipal 
borders.134  At times, spillover is deliberate.  Governments may seek to 
off-load a greater portion of the costs of their activity by, for example, 
locating big box stores (with resultant traffic, aesthetic, and other 
costs) or industrial activities (with environmental and stigmatic costs) 
on municipal borders.135  At times, the spillover effects are 
unintentional.  By downzoning or preventing new housing 
developments, for example, municipalities may unintentionally 
                                                          
COUNTY, at 68 (2015), http://www.montcopa.org/DocumentCenter/View/7719 
(discussing the need to “attract and retain businesses and vital community assets” to 
provide “a strong tax base”). 
 133. See, e.g., JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POLICY INSTITUTE OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13:  
SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 11–12 (1998) (stating that Proposition 13 led 
municipalities to compete for new big box stores and car dealerships); FUNDAMENTAL 
PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 8 (claiming that increasing property taxes 
without new revenues led New Jersey to overzone for commercial development and 
underzone for housing); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Simple Analytics of 
Land Value Taxation, in LAND VALUE TAXATION:  THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 51, 
67–68 (Richard F. Dye & Richard W. England eds., 2009) (finding that while property 
taxes theoretically might increase or decrease sprawl, in practice the taxes’ effect is to 
increase sprawl); Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy, 64 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1483 (2014) (showing that states without the authority to tax 
fracking activity were far more likely to enact fracking bans); Wassmer, supra note 117, 
at 1324 (showing the impact of sales tax reliance on non-urban retail sprawl); BENOY 
JACOB & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, BORDER WARS:  DO TAXES INFLUENCE LAND USE DECISIONS 
ACROSS STATE BOUNDARIES? 17 (2009) (unpublished paper on file with author) 
(demonstrating effects of property, sales, and income tax reliance on approval of 
developments); see also Kurt Paulsen, The Effects of Land Development on Municipal 
Finance, 29 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 20, 20–21 (2014) (stating that revenue and cost 
modeling has become much more common in planning in recent years). 
 134. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE:  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS vii (1993) (discussing the 
importance of spillover effects); Paulsen, supra note 133, at 26 (“Projections of likely 
fiscal impacts for one community almost never consider the fiscal, land use, and 
other indirect impacts on neighboring jurisdictions”). 
 135. See JACOB & PAGANO, supra note 133, at 10–11, 16, 30–31 (discussing the 
spillover effect and noting its presence in retail development in Tempe, Arizona and 
Kansas City, Kansas); Franco Ordonez, Neighbors Prefer Sweets to Power Plant:  Doughnuts 
Warehouse Considered, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003, http://archive.boston.com/news/lo 
cal/articles/2003/11/30/neighbors_prefer_sweets_to_power_plant (discussing a 
decision to approve a power plant in a neighborhood near the Charles River). 
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increase sprawl and undermine availability of affordable housing 
across the region.136  Similarly, as multiple municipalities in a region 
chase retail tax dollars, they may increase retail sprawl and decrease 
open space for all.137 
Of course, overall revenue is not the only goal motivating land use 
decisions.  The homevoter hypothesis means that homevoter wishes, 
such as those for open space or against industrial uses, may hold sway 
over revenue-maximizing land uses.  Splashy but costly projects, such 
as sports stadiums, may appear more attractive to politicians.  
Municipal governments may also fail to accurately calculate either the 
costs or revenues from new developments.138  For example, 
municipalities across the country provide property tax rebates to lure 
job-producing businesses even though, in the absence of local 
income taxes, these businesses are unlikely to produce compensating 
revenue for the municipality.139  As governments all use the same 
techniques to lure businesses, moreover, the likelihood that the 
business will be lured away before it creates surplus revenue 
increases.140  Municipalities may also fail to account for competitive 
effects within their own borders, such as the impact of big box 
developments on the edge of town draining business and vitality from 
the center of town.141 
In short, although governments do at times take tax revenues into 
account, this consideration often fails to result in land use decisions 
that benefit either the local residents or the governments themselves. 
                                                          
 136. See FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 84, at 1 (discussing the 
ways that increased commercial zoning inadvertently decreases affordable housing). 
 137. See id. (finding that commercial zoning has led to a decrease in the 
availability of green spaces). 
 138. See JACK R. HUDDLESTON, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, THE INTERSECTION 
BETWEEN PLANNING AND THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET 1–2 (2005) (discussing a town that 
pursued intensive downtown redevelopment to compensate for big box development 
at the city’s edge, but found that the costs of maintaining the development 
overwhelmed the city budget). 
 139. DAPHNE A. KENYON, ADAM H. LANGLEY & BETHANY P. PAQUIN, LINCOLN INST. OF 
LAND POLICY, RETHINKING PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS 2 (2012) (noting 
that governments lose $5 to 10 billion dollars per year on property tax exemptions 
despite a lack of evidence that they generate economic development). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Paulsen, supra note 133, at 33–34. 
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C. Governments Do React to Full Compensation for Regulatory 
Restrictions—And That’s Usually a Bad Thing 
Although the tax feedback loop will not necessarily motivate 
governments to enact fiscally and socially advantageous land use 
measures, the full compensation response actually deters 
governments from enacting such measures.  Because, as discussed 
above, full compensation to the owner is so different from and 
usually so much greater than the benefits experienced by the 
government, one-to-one compensation may deter even efficient 
decisions.  Evidence from states that have required broad 
compensation for losses caused by land use restrictions confirms this.  
Full compensation requirements do not lead to more efficient 
regulations; they simply shut regulation down. 
The most extreme example comes from Oregon’s short-lived 
Measure 37, which required governments to compensate owners 
retroactively for losses in value due to land use restrictions enacted 
after the owners acquired their land.142  In the three years before 
Measure 37 was substantially modified in a second voter initiative, 
owners filed over 7000 claims for compensation.143  In all but one 
case, the responsible government simply waived the regulation rather 
than compensate.144  The dominant explanation municipalities gave 
for these decisions was that they lacked funds to pay compensation.145  
For example, the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners repeatedly 
justified its decisions by saying, “[T]he Board finds it is in the public 
interest, due to the lack of resources to pay compensation, to modify, 
remove or choose not to apply the challenged land use regulation to 
the subject property and issue the ‘waiver’ to claimants.”146 
The waivers, if not largely repealed by Measure 49, would have had 
predictable negative consequences.147  Many of the building rights 
                                                          
 142. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do:  Evidence from the 
Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1287 (2009) (asserting that Measure 37 
“fundamentally reworked governmental compensation requirements”). 
 143. Id. at 1284. 
 144. Id. at 1303. 
 145. Id. at 1307. 
 146. In re Ballot Measure 37 Claim of Walter and Sara Maguire, No. 06-LURCC-06, 
Order No. 11-06-380, at 1, 2 (Bd. of Comm’rs for Lincoln Cty., Or., Nov. 8, 2006) 
(approving a claim to divide property into up to eighty one-acre parcels); see also In re 
Ballot Measure 37 Claim of Robert and Janice Foley, No. 147-LURCC-06, Order No. 
9-07-708, at 1, 3 (Bd. of Comm’rs for Lincoln Cty., Or., Sept. 12, 2007) (approving a 
claim to divide property into up to nine one-acre parcels). 
 147. Berger, supra note 142, at 1305. 
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would have undermined state groundwater protections.148  Lane 
County officials, for example, opined that the planned developments 
could “imperil the quality of customers’ drinking water” in the county 
by increasing levels of fecal bacteria and other contaminants.149  The 
Oregon Department of Agriculture also found that Measure 37 
development would have “major implications” for Oregon’s 
multibillion dollar agricultural industry.150  But faced with the 
disproportionate costs of paying the owners for the entire reduced 
value of the owners’ land, from funds that the governments did not 
have then and would likely not recoup, if at all, for many years, the 
governments waived the restrictions. 
Measure 37 was particularly extreme because it required 
compensation for the effects of regulations enacted long before the 
initiative came into effect.151  But laws with solely prospective effects 
in Florida and Arizona also chill land use regulations.  Florida’s Bert 
J. Harris Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (“Bert-Harris”), 
enacted in 1995, requires compensation for land use restrictions that 
“inordinately burden[]” property owners.152  Most of the planners 
and government attorneys interviewed for a 2005 study reported that 
Bert-Harris “fundamentally restricted their ability to do the[ir] job” 
by giving individual owners power to freeze land use laws in place.153  
As in Oregon, few governments chose to litigate under Bert-Harris.  
Instead, most chose not to enact or to waive land use rules in the face 
of Bert-Harris claims.154  For developers, meanwhile, threatening a 
claim under the act became an easy way to circumvent legal obstacles 
to their plans.155  By 2006, even Senator Harris, the sponsor who gave 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 1306. 
 149. Id. (quoting Jeff Wright, Claims Spur Watershed Warning, REGISTER-GUARD 
(Or.), Feb. 8, 2007, at A1). 
 150. Id. (quoting Oregon Dept. of Agriculture Develops Maps to Show Impact of Measure 
37 Claims:  Willamette Valley Farmland Faces Measure 37 Impact, OR. ASS’N OF NURSERIES 
(Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.oan.org/?500#). 
 151. Id. at 1310. 
 152. Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 70.001 
(2016). 
 153. George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving “Partial 
Takings” from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAW. 269, 288 (2005). 
 154. John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings 
Legislation:  Lessons from Democracy’s Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 459, 460–69 
(2009). 
 155. Id. at 464. 
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his name to the act, worried that the law may have become a 
“development shelter.”156 
Studies report a similar effect for Arizona’s Proposition 207 (“Prop 
207”),157 enacted in 2006.158  In the wake of the act, municipalities 
waived or failed to enact historic preservation, infill, and urban form 
restrictions rather than expose residents to potentially ruinous suits 
for damages.159  The law came too late to contribute much to the 
massive sprawling construction before the Great Recession.  Between 
2005 and 2006 alone, 60,000 houses were built surrounding 
Phoenix—and in the years afterward, those developments went empty 
and new ones were not built.160  Today, however, massive new 
leapfrog-style suburban developments are being planned in areas that 
would be water-challenged even without current drought 
conditions.161  Prop 207, however, “effectively eviscerated land-use 
laws” that could slow growth.162 
Whether the overall benefits of the unenacted or waived 
regulations would have outweighed the costs is not clear.  Most likely, 
some would have and others would not.  But requiring full 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 459. 
 157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134 (2016). 
 158. See, e.g., Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 154, at 522–24 (discussing 
the way Proposition 207 undermined historic preservation); Jeffrey L. Sparks, Land 
Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private Property Rights Protection Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 
211, 219–22 (2009) (reporting that Prop 207 had already chilled land use regulation 
in Arizona); see also Kristena Hansen, Phoenix Grapples with Building Preservation amid 
Legal Threats, PHX. BUS. J. (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/prin 
t-edition/2012/12/07/phoenix-grapples-with-building.html (quoting Mesa Mayor 
Mark Smith’s statement that “there’s no doubt Prop. 207 has changed cities’ 
approach” to Phoenix’s 2012 attempt to protect a Frank Lloyd Wright home). 
 159. See Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 154, at 522–23; see also Sparks, 
supra note 158, at 220–21; Infill Development:  Completing the Community Fabric, MUN. 
RES. & SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/Development-
Types-and-Land-Uses/Infill-Development-Completing-the-Community-Fabric.aspx 
(last updated Aug. 16, 2016). 
 160. Jonathan Thompson, Huge New “Communities” Planned for Tucson, Albuquerque:  
Sprawl Rises from Its Slumber, but Urban Renaissance Is Still Thriving, HIGH COUNTRY 
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.hcn.org/articles/huge-new-communities-planned-
for-tucson-and-albuquerque-fringes. 
 161. See id. (describing the development within a “sizable swath of open desert 
between Tucson’s urban fringe and the planned development”). 
 162. Jonathan Thompson, Light Rail Enters the West’s Most Sprawling Metropolis:  New 
Transportation Sparked a Renaissance in Denver.  Can It Do the Same for Phoenix?, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.hcn.org/issues/46.20/two-cities-develop-
public-transportation; see also City of Flagstaff, Student Housing Symposium (Oct. 27, 
2014) (describing Prop 207 as “the largest impediment to local land-use regulation to 
control student housing” because it makes down-zoning very expensive). 
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compensation for the owners’ losses does not appear to lead to the 
hoped-for careful balancing of potential costs and benefits.  Instead, 
it simply shuts it down.  As discussed in Part I, this only makes sense:  
the governmental revenue benefits, even of efficient regulations, are 
almost always less than the cost of full compensation.163 
D. Conclusion 
Given the motivations and structure of governmental decision 
making, balancing costs and benefits through the tax structure will 
not necessarily affect land use decisions.  When it does affect decision 
making, moreover, the result may not be more efficient regulation of 
land use.  But lack of governmental responsiveness to fiscal incentives 
presents a challenge not simply to the effectiveness of the tax 
feedback loop; rather, it undermines the argument that cost-
internalization plays a helpful role in land use decisions at all.  Full 
compensation, moreover, distorts all consideration of costs and 
benefits by imposing costs on the government that are so far beyond 
what the government will likely realize, even for efficient regulations. 
IV. SO WHAT?—OR, FOCUS ON FAIRNESS 
Increasing overall efficiency in governmental land use decisions is 
not the only, or even the most, important argument in favor of 
compensation requirements.  The dominant justification for 
compensation remains that it is required as a matter of fairness to the 
individual owner.  The argument that compensation is necessary to 
align government costs and benefits, however, undermines careful 
examination of the fairness justification.  The apparent symmetry 
between the compensation required to achieve efficiency and fairness 
clouds separate interrogation of these objectives and the most 
effective ways to achieve them.  By showing that accurate cost 
internalization does not require compensation, this Article allows 
closer analysis of what compensation fairness does in fact require. 
A. The Fairness Justification for Compensation 
Fairness is a far older justification for compensation than efficiency 
and remains judicially more influential.  Justice Holmes distinguished 
the fairness justification from the utilitarian justification in his 1922 
                                                          
 163. See supra Part I (discussing the efficiency argument and explaining why 
governments enact inefficient land-use regulations). 
BERGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  8:09 PM 
38 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
opinion creating the regulatory taking.164  Regardless of the public 
interest in the restriction, he stated, “the question at bottom is upon 
whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.”165  The Court 
formulated the problem more starkly in Armstrong v. United States,166 
stating that the takings guarantee “was designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”167 
The efficiency argument is far less prominent in takings 
jurisprudence.  A search of Supreme Court takings decisions turns up 
none that use the term “fiscal illusion.”  Only one Supreme Court 
opinion uses the term “efficiency” to analyze a takings rule, and that 
reference is in a dissent arguing against compensation for a 
regulatory restriction.168  Justice Alito’s 2013 opinion in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District169 invokes the insistence that 
“landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct” 
but only as a justification for the general rule upholding land use 
restrictions against regulatory takings claims.170 
It is of course true that the Court has long debated the effect of a 
compensation requirement as a “check to the exercise of . . . 
discretion by the legislature” and an incentive for investment in 
property.171  But these debates have always been closely tied to 
arguments about fairness to the individuals whose rights are claimed 
to be lost.172  The fairness-efficiency link also appears in one of the 
most explicit modern discussions of the efficiency justification for 
compensation, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Pennell v. City of San Jose.173  
                                                          
 164. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (stating that the public need 
for the action does not itself justify not paying compensation). 
 165. Id. at 416. 
 166. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 167. Id. at 49.  Since its drafting, this pithy phrase has been cited at least twenty-
seven times by the Supreme Court alone. 
 168. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1070 n.5 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that finding a taking in that case would have undermined 
efficiency by creating a “moral hazard”). 
 169. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 170. Id. at 2595. 
 171. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 564 (1837) (McLean, 
J., concurring) (stating that property owners would not invest to improve property if 
they were likely to lose it to the government without compensation). 
 172. See id. at 566 (stating that the rights of “associations of men to accomplish 
enterprises of importance to the public, and who have vested their funds on the 
public faith, . . . do not become the sport of popular excitement, any more than the 
rights of other citizens”). 
 173. 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
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The Court there rejected as unripe a challenge that a limitation on 
rent increases unconstitutionally took the property of the 
landlords.174  Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the provision was 
facially unconstitutional.175 
One of Justice Scalia’s arguments was that if implemented, the 
provision would permit the public to accomplish its goal of providing 
housing for low-income people without having to acknowledge their 
costs.176  This would result in both inefficient decisions and unfairness 
to landlords: 
 The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it 
permits wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved 
otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved “off 
budget,” with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from 
normal democratic processes. . . .  Subsidies for these groups may 
well be a good idea, but because of the operation of the Takings 
Clause our governmental system has required them to be applied, 
in general, through the process of taxing and spending, where 
both economic effects and competing priorities are more evident. 
 That fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one of the 
happy effects of the constitutional prescription—perhaps 
accidental, perhaps not.  Its essence, however, is simply the 
unfairness of making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than 
taxes, to remedy a social problem that is none of his creation.177 
If one equates the government’s fiscal gain to the owner’s loss from 
land use restrictions, such links between fairness and efficiency seem 
only logical.  By revealing that the fiscal check on inefficient 
regulations of land use exists independent of compensation to the 
owner, however, we can more carefully interrogate what losses 
property owners may demand as a matter of fairness alone. 
                                                          
 174. Id. at 9–10. 
 175. Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 176. Id. at 22. 
 177. Id. at 22–23.  Justice Scalia’s dissent inspired one state supreme court and 
one Federal Court of Appeals opinion, although the first was a dissent and the 
second was later vacated.  Cf. Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of L.A., 968 P.2d 
993, 1045 (Cal. 1999) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Pennell 
suggests, [when the costs of rent control] are paid by rental property owners through 
government compulsion, however, it is impossible to measure the intensity of public 
support for rent subsidies.”); Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1022 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (Rent control takes “from A to give to B, both for the benefit of B (the 
incumbent tenants) and for a larger group, who does not wish to support affordable 
housing through more politic means”), vacated, 638 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not empower courts to impose sound 
economic principles on political bodies.”). 
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B. What Compensation Does Fairness Require? 
Previous Sections discussed why compensation, even if potentially 
useful to prevent over-taking of physical property, is not necessary to 
prevent over-regulation:  the government does not acquire the 
property at all and loses tax revenue, revenue that will only be made 
up by gains in taxation or decreases in services in other areas.178  
Similarly, basic fairness would seem to demand compensation when 
the government directly acquires the property or transfers it to 
another, but this calculus shifts when the government simply 
regulates how the owner uses the land.179 
The reasons are already reflected in the case law.  First, when an 
owner is prevented from engaging in a use that is broadly agreed to 
be harmful, justice does not usually demand that the owner be paid 
to stop such use.180  There may be compelling justice claims when the 
government, rather than preventing exploitation of a new use of 
property, makes the owner stop a current use of the property.181  Even 
                                                          
 178. See supra Section I.B. 
 179. Like the efficiency calculation discussed in note 27, supra, the justice 
calculation is different in cases in which the regulatory restriction is the equivalent of 
an easement for the government’s own use.  This is evident in cases involving height 
restrictions imposed on buildings in the flight path of airports, which are more 
frequently found to be takings.  See Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) 
(finding the seizure of an air easement over the petitioner’s property was a taking).  
In fact, the papers of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes suggest that Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the first Supreme Court case to find that a 
regulatory restriction was a taking, was motivated by the sense that the restriction on 
digging coal so as to cause subsidence was designed to protect the government’s own 
streets and roads located above the coal mines.  William Michael Treanor, Jam for 
Justice Holmes:  Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 859–60 (1998). 
 180. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a 
hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations 
against constitutional attack.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
125 (1978) (stating that land-use regulations that promote the “health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare” are typically upheld).  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council appeared to 
reject the harm/benefit distinction but quickly resurrected it by saying that individuals 
could not claim compensation if the action was prohibited by “background principles 
of nuisance and property law.”  505 U.S. 1003, 1030–31 (1992). 
 181. The classic example is Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in which 
the Court rejected a takings claim by the owner of a brickyard whose operations were 
prevented because a residential neighborhood had grown up around his existing 
operation.  See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the 
Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1009–11 (1999) (arguing that compensation 
should be provided in cases such as Hadacheck even though stopping operations was 
the efficiency-producing result). 
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here, compensation is often not required.  As nuisance law has 
recognized since candlemakers wafted their stench over Cotswold 
cottages, in some cases the law must make a choice between one 
owner’s use and another’s,182 and it usually need not pay the loser 
when it does.183 
Second, property only has value within a particular context, and 
much of that context is created by governmental infrastructure and 
surrounding properties that emerge from it.  Regulatory takings 
analysis therefore looks not just to the value an owner could realize if 
the property could be used without a particular governmental 
regulation but also to the owner’s “distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”184  This inquiry requires attention to both whether the 
opportunity the owner seeks to exploit is itself the product of 
governmental regulation and the extent to which the owner has 
already reasonably recouped the investment in the property. 
Demands for compensation generally hold constant all 
governmental inputs other than the impact of the restriction on the 
property itself.185  But of course, governmental inputs into property 
value are pervasive.186  Restrictions that apply to a range of properties 
create a “scarcity effect[]” by limiting the properties that can violate 
the restriction, thereby increasing the value of lifting the restriction on 
any one property.187  Second, governmental actions—whether by 
preventing the harm the restriction is intended to avoid, or by 
independent provision of infrastructure or other “amenity effect[s]”—
                                                          
 182. See SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 106 (2d ed. 1890) (stating that medieval nuisance case against a 
candlemaking factory was dismissed because, “Le utility del chose excusera le 
noisomeness del stink”).  Or, in Anglo-Norman legal “French,” the utility of the thing 
excuses its noisome stink. 
 183. Whether the plaintiff came to the nuisance remains a factor in the analysis 
but is no longer an absolute defense.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D 
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that the fact that the plaintiff came to the nuisance is a 
factor but “is not in itself sufficient to bar his action”).  Despite the academic 
celebration of the purchased injunction of Spur Industries v. Webb, 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 
1972), the ruling seems to have been a one-time remedy, tailored to the egregious 
action of the developer.  No other opinions use the phrase “purchased injunction,” 
and I have been unable to find any references to such cases in the literature. 
 184. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 185. See Berger, supra note 142, at 1316. 
 186. For a fuller discussion, see Berger, supra note 142, at 1316–18 (discussing the 
governmental inputs that often have an effect on property value). 
 187. William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36 
ENVTL. L. 105, 106 (2006). 
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increase the value of the location for all uses.188  Just as the government 
does not claim precise payback for all incidental benefits to individual 
property value, fairness rarely demands compensation when the 
individual is the loser in the governmental action calculus. 
Take, for example, the infamous office tower Penn Central 
proposed to balance on Grand Central Station.  With more than fifty 
additional floors of office space in a midtown transportation hub, 
Penn Central hoped eventually to net between 2 and 2.3 million 
dollars per year on the addition.189  But this value was, even more 
than for other New York real estate, inextricable from governmental 
support and regulation.190 
First, imagine that same piece of real estate on Manhattan Island 
without the rest of New York City around it.  The land would be 
worth something, but not enough to justify building a fifty-story office 
tower, or even a five-story one.  For New York City to exist requires 
the vast governmental resources that permit millions of people to live 
and work together.  Of course it would be wholly unjust to 
compensate New York owners for property losses at the rate similar 
properties would command in an undeveloped wilderness.  But 
imagine now, not Manhattan undeveloped, but Manhattan as it in 
fact was in the 1970s when Penn Central was litigating its claim, with 
the Bronx burning, garbage workers on strike,191 and New York City 
itself preparing to file for bankruptcy.192  The office tower, had it 
been built, would surely have suffered from the commercial real 
                                                          
 188. Id. 
 189. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116. 
 190. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (N.Y. 
1977) (“It may be true that no property has economic value in the absence of the 
society around it, but how much more true it is of a railroad terminal, set amid a 
metropolitan population, and entirely dependent on a heavy traffic of travelers to 
make it an economically feasible operation. Without people Grand Central would 
never have been a successful railroad terminal, and without the terminal, a major 
transportation center, the proposed building site would be much less desirable for an 
office building.”), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 191. Kevin Baker, “Welcome to Fear City” – The Inside Story of New York’s Civil War, 40 
Years on, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/ 
18/welcome-to-fear-city-the-inside-story-of-new-yorks-civil-war-40-years-on. 
 192. Ralph Blumenthal, Recalling New York at the Brink of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/05/nyregion/recalling-new-york-
at-the-brink-of-bankruptcy.html. 
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estate glut and bust at the beginning of the 1970s193 and benefitted 
from government subsidization of the recovery.194 
Even setting aside governmental contributions to these and other 
developments, the value of the proposed office tower was always in 
part a government creation.  Grand Central was, after all, the New 
York terminus of the interstate railroad system, which—from its 
inception—was the product of government subsidies, eminent 
domain, rights-of-way, and monopolies.195  New York City added to 
these federal and state inputs by placing stations for multiple subway 
lines under the terminal and bus lines beside it.196  The city further 
subsidized the station by exempting it from most property taxes, a 
benefit to Penn Central of over eleven million dollars in the previous 
decade.197  In fact, the landmark preservation policy Penn Central 
challenged was itself in service of something that Penn Central 
depended on more than most businesses—keeping New York an 
attractive destination for those from out-of-town.198  In sum, it was 
almost entirely governmental action that made Grand Central 
Terminal one of the most desirable commercial addresses in New 
York.  It was the height of chutzpah for Penn Central to claim that 
the government had to pay because the company could not exploit 
all of the economic potential that resulted from this government 
action.199 
                                                          
 193. See Vincent Mosco, The Empire at Ground Zero, in URBAN COMMUNICATION:  
PRODUCTION, TEXT, CONTEXT 209 (Timothy A. Gibson & Mark Lowes eds., 2007) 
(discussing New York’s office space glut and recovery). 
 194. See GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, NEW YORK CITY:  A SHORT HISTORY 214–20 (2002) 
(describing New York’s dire financial state in the 1970s and the programs 
implemented for rehabilitation). 
 195. Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1276–77. 
 196. Id. at 1276. 
 197. Findings of Fact and Declarations of the Law of New York, Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York, Supreme Court, Trial Term (May 29, 1974), 
reprinted in Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) at 53a. 
 198. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1275 (describing Grand Central’s reliance 
on out-of-town traffic).  At that point, of course, the newly merged Penn Central 
Company was no longer as interested in the declining railway business.  The 
company had sold off its air development rights in 1968—the same year it merged 
with New York Central—which was one of several poor business decisions leading to 
the company’s bankruptcy in 1970. 
 199. See id. at 1276 (“Plaintiffs may not now frustrate legitimate and important 
social objectives by complaining, in essence, that government regulation deprives 
them of a return on so much of the investment made not by private interests but by 
the people of the city and State through their government.”). 
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Delinking the cost internalization and justice aspects of a 
regulatory takings claim may also permit more careful attention to the 
investment in the specific opportunity the owner seeks to exploit.  
Although return on investment is a well-established aspect of the 
regulatory takings inquiry,200 demands for compensation rarely mention 
the owner’s original investment in the property.201  To the extent this 
information is available, often even with the restriction, the owner will 
still profit after adjusting for inflation.202  Where the owner’s use now 
undermines public interest, even in cases where the conflict was totally 
unforeseeable, it is not clear that fairness demands more. 
Take as an example the much-litigated wetlands and coastal 
development restrictions.  In many such cases, the restricted portion 
of land was originally part of a larger purchase, but the owners had 
developed and sold the upland portion long before the restriction’s 
enactment.203  By the time the owners finally sought to develop the 
                                                          
 200. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982) (“[T]he degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of 
particular significance”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 
136 (1978) (analyzing the regulation’s fiscal impact on the property); United States 
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (considering the property’s value in the Court’s 
takings evaluation). 
 201. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (not discussing 
original investment); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) 
(not providing original investment). 
 202. The Measure 37 campaign in Oregon, for example, was driven by ads 
featuring Dorothy English, a grandmotherly woman, complaining that Oregon’s land 
use laws prevented her from subdividing the land she had purchased with her 
husband fifty years earlier.  English and her husband, however, had already sold off 
half of the original purchase decades before, netting about ten times the original 
price for the land.  At the time she made the ads, moreover, her remaining property 
was worth 150 times what she and her husband had paid for the whole parcel, or 
twenty-one times in time-adjusted dollars.  Berger, supra note 142, at 1321.  This is a 
considerably better return than she would have gotten had the same investment 
received a compounding 10% interest rate for a similar time.  See Compound Interest 
Calculator, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://investor.gov/tools/calculators/compou 
nd-interest-calculator (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), is a notorious exception.  David Lucas allegedly 
purchased his two lots for almost one million dollars before South Carolina 
established that he could not build on the lots.  Id. at 1006–07.  However, Lucas’ 
purchase at top-of-the-market prices for two parcels from the partnership he had 
recently left seems to require more explanation.  See Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green 
Machine:  Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY 
STORIES 299, 304–06 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009) 
(speculating that the purchase price may have been set to reap tax benefits). 
 203. See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1288–90 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (setting forth that the plaintiff bought 2750 acres of coastal property, sold 
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wetlands portion, intervening legislation prevented the change.204  It 
seems likely that at the inception of the purchases, draining and 
filling the land would not have been economically worthwhile, but 
the value of the easy-to-develop parcels made the investment 
profitable even without doing so.  Only after other nearby land had 
been developed—often with government-financed water, sewer, and 
transportation infrastructure; subsidized flood insurance; and 
emergency assistance after natural disasters—would it be sufficiently 
profitable to develop the last remaining land.  At this point, even the 
restrictions on wetlands development would enhance the property’s 
value to the plaintiffs, effectively creating a monopoly in the area.  
Only a very peculiar sense of fairness would decree compensation for 
owners because they could not profit from this monopoly.205 
This Section is obviously not a comprehensive or conclusive 
examination of whether and what degree of compensation is fair for 
regulatory restrictions.  Rather, this Section argues that the linkage of 
fairness-based compensation and efficiency-based compensation may 
have distorted the analysis of each, individually.  Understanding that 
economic costs are already balanced—at least as well as they can be—
through the tax system may allow more thoroughgoing examination 
of the fairness question.  This examination should place less 
emphasis on an isolated analysis of the value of the land with and 
without the restriction, and more on what other factors created that 
value as well as on whether the owner has already recouped any 
investment justice demands the owner reap from the land. 
                                                          
or developed the vast majority, and did not consider developing the 4.99 acres at 
issue until 2002); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (setting forth that the plaintiffs originally purchased 311 acres, sold 
the 260 upland acres, received permits to fill the remaining acres in 1961, but 
allowed the permits to expire and did not again seek to develop the area until 1988); 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(involving plaintiffs who purchased a 250-acre tract in 1956, developed upland 199 
acres, and did not seek to develop the remainder until 1970s); Palazzolo v. State, 746 
A.2d 707, 709–10 (R.I. 2000) (concerning a plaintiff and partner who originally 
developed only the small upland portion of the land, and only much later sought to 
develop the portion that would need dredging and fill). 
 204. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d at 1173–74 (referencing the impact of the 
Clean Water Act legislation, passed in 1972, which regulated development near 
bodies of water). 
 205. Despite this, the Federal Circuit recently found that only the impact on the 
undeveloped fraction of land should be considered in such a claim.  Lost Tree, 707 
F.3d at 1294–95. 
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C. Regulatory Takings and Murr v. Wisconsin 
All of these considerations are relevant to Murr v. Wisconsin, the 
regulatory takings case pending in the Supreme Court.206 
The case involves two neighboring lots on the St. Croix River, 
purchased by the petitioners’ parents in 1960 and 1963.207  The 
parents built a vacation cabin on the first lot and left the second 
undeveloped.208  In 1994 and 1995 they transferred the first and then 
the second lot to their children, both times without compensation.209  
In 2004, over four decades after the original purchases, the children 
became interested in selling the undeveloped lot.210  They then were 
allegedly “flabbergasted” to learn that they could not build on the 
lot.211  In 1975, the County amended its zoning ordinances to comply 
with federal and state laws designating the St. Croix River as a “part of 
the National Wild and Scenic River System,”212 as well as to prevent 
erosion, water contamination and flooding, and to protect property 
values.213  The ordinances required that a lot include at least one acre 
of buildable area before construction on the bluffs would be 
permitted.214  Because the lots are located on an extreme slope and 
also subject to wetlands and right-of-way restrictions, the buildable 
area of the undeveloped parcel is only 0.5 acres, and the buildable 
area of the developed parcel is 0.48 acres.215  The 1975 restriction, 
however, has an exception that permits building a single family 
residence on lots of less than one acre created before 1976.216  
Because, however, the Murrs own both lots, and there is already a 
residence on the combined lots, their property does not qualify for 
                                                          
 206. 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016), granting cert. in Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 
WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (per curiam). 
 207. Murr, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2015 WL 
4932231, at *4 (2015). 
 210. Id. at *4. 
 211. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 5, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2016 WL 
1459199, at 1, 5 (2016). 
 212. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County at 4, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 
2016 WL 3254214, at 1, 5 (2016). 
 213. Id. at 7–8. 
 214. Id. at 8; St. Croix Cty., Wis., Land Use & Dev. Ord. § 17.36.G.1.b (July 1, 2005). 
 215. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 209, at *5 n.1. 
 216. See id. at *5 (explaining that landowners may build on “any lot created prior 
to January 1, 1976 . . . but only if the lot ‘is in separate ownership from abutting 
lands’”). 
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the exception.217  The Murrs petitioned the Supreme Court to 
determine that the undeveloped parcel should be considered 
separately for regulatory takings analysis.218 
Compensation should not have been needed to make the 
municipality internalize the economic costs of the restriction.  
Because Wisconsin is among one of the most property-tax dependent 
states in the union,219 St. Croix County should already have 
internalized the effects of its restricting more extensive development 
in this vacation community through lost tax revenue.  The Murrs’ 
case, however, reveals the flaws in tax assessments as a reflection of 
value.  Until the dispute began, the assessment did not reflect the 
zoning restriction, and the lots were assessed as individual buildable 
lots.220  Once the dispute began, however, the Murrs challenged the 
assessment, and the lots are now being taxed as a single buildable 
lot.221  The County is now (albeit belatedly) internalizing the 
economic cost of the restriction. 
The fairness considerations discussed above also weigh against 
compensation.  First, the value the Murrs hope to exploit is at least in 
part the result of governmental action.  By prohibiting building on 
lots with less than one buildable acre of land, the County limited the 
supply of buildable land in St. Croix and surely raised the price of 
land that could still be developed.222  By restricting the number of 
new residents to the community, moreover, the restriction likely 
prevented growth in demand for taxpayer funded services and 
thereby reduced the tax burden on existing residents.  And the 
wetlands and slope preservation restrictions that limited the buildable 
portion of existing parcels likely helped to preserve St. Croix River 
County as a peaceful community on the water. 
Even if the value the Murrs claim to have lost could be separated 
from their gains from the governmental action, they have no 
investment-backed expectations that must be compensated to achieve 
                                                          
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at *9, *22. 
 219. Forster & Padgitt, supra note 50, at 2 (listing Wisconsin as one of the ten most 
property-dependent states). 
 220. Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 212, at 32 n.13. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Brief of Carlisle Ford Runge et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, 2016 WL 3398639, at 1, 2–3 (2016) 
(explaining how property value may be increased “by restricting the amount of 
development that can occur in an area”). 
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justice.  First, the petitioners themselves obtained both lots for free.223  
While the ability to give property to one’s children is precious, and 
one should not diminish property rights simply because they came as 
a gift, the lots here still have substantial value.224  There hardly seems 
to be a compelling justice claim because the gift is not worth quite as 
much as the recipients hoped. 
Most importantly, for more than forty years, the petitioners and 
their parents were happy to use the property in exactly the way in 
which they can still use it, as land surrounding their vacation residence.  
The Murrs treated the lot as part of their larger property, using it for 
swimming, camping, and parking, even building a volleyball court 
there.225  Indeed, the additional buildable area and river frontage 
secured by combining the two lots enhances their value to such a 
degree that they would only be worth 10% more if developed 
separately.226  Fairness does not demand payment simply because the 
Murrs cannot now exploit part of their property in violation of the 
public calculation about the needs of their community. 
CONCLUSION 
The assertion that compensation will correct fiscal illusion in 
governmental land restrictions rests on mistaken premises.  The 
argument treats the revenue gained by governments the same as the 
loss to owners that results from the restrictions.  This assumption is 
wrong.  Governments generally only experience revenue increases 
through tax benefits, which are by design a small fraction of the value 
experienced by society as a whole.  What is more, governments also 
experience lost revenue, again through the tax system, from 
restrictions that reduce the value of land and the income it produces. 
Revealing this mistake leads to three important conclusions.  First, 
requiring full compensation for regulatory restrictions is not 
necessary to cause governments to internalize the costs of their 
actions.  The tax system already does this.  Inefficient land use 
measures—those whose costs outweigh their benefits—will lead to a 
decrease in government revenues, and efficient ones—those whose 
                                                          
 223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 209, at *4. 
 224. See Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 212, at 18–19 (noting 
that the property was worth $698,000 sold as a single lot). 
 225. Id. at 13. 
 226. See id. at 18–19 n.12 (noting that the trial court found that the combined lots 
with a single home would be worth $698,000, while the two lots sold separately each 
with a home would be worth $771,000). 
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benefits outweigh their costs—will lead to an increase in government 
revenues or at least reduced demands on such revenues.  The 
qualifications to this equation are discussed above, but overall, the tax 
system already is a far more accurate way to ensure that governments 
feel the economic impact of their actions than is full compensation. 
Second, full compensation will only distort government efforts to 
enact efficient land use policies.  Because the cost of full compensation 
far outweighs the revenue benefits even of efficient regulations, 
governments will rationally choose not to enact regulations that would 
be socially beneficial.  Evidence from states that require full 
compensation for losses due to land use restrictions bears this out. 
Third, revealing that full compensation is not necessary to 
achieve—and in fact undermines—efficiency allows more careful 
analysis of the fairness justification for compensation.  In particular, 
full compensation shifts attention from the reduction in dollar value 
due to the restriction in isolation, to the portion of that value the 
owner should be able to demand from the government.  Under this 
analysis, compensation will often not be required because the 
governmental restrictions are in fact what makes property valuable to 
begin with, and because the value remaining with the owner is more 
than sufficient to satisfy justice. 
Determining when regulatory restrictions should result in owner 
compensation is a wilderness of competing ideological concerns and 
real world effects.  This Article is not the magic path out of that 
wilderness.  It seeks only to clear some of the underbrush obscuring 
the way.  Doing so, it is hoped, will facilitate progress toward just and 
beneficial regulation of land. 
 
